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SAIGON POST  
26 May 1969

# Hanoi's Contempt For Humaneness

By Vicente G. Martinez

Communists in general, and the Hanoi regime in particular, have often shown their contempt for humanitarian values, for human compassion, for ties of family and friendship. They have also shown a complete disregard for the repugnance and disapproval their heartlessness often arouses in the rest of mankind, possibly because they prefer to believe that the conscience of mankind can be manipulated by their dupes who stage phony war crimes tribunals and mass meetings in Stockholm and elsewhere. Possibly also because they treat their own people no better than they treat their enemies, they feel mankind has no reason to complain.

Xuan Thuy, the Hanoi regime representative in Paris, demonstrated this contempt of everyone perfectly the other day after American Defense Secretary Laird had once again called upon the Hanoi regime to treat prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Laird asked Hanoi to (a) provide a list of names of all prisoners of war, (b) release sick and wounded prisoners, (c) permit impartial inspections of prisoners' facilities, (d) provide proper treatment for all prisoners, and (e) permit a regular flow of mail to and from the prisoners. Xuan Thuy simply stated the Americans «will never have that list (of prisoners of war) as long as the United States does not cease its war of aggression in Vietnam.»

In other words, so long as the war continues, Xuan Thuy says, North Vietnam will not adhere to the Geneva Convention rules governing the conduct of combatants in war. The Hanoi regime admits it holds American prisoners, claims it is treating them

humanely, but refuses to say who they are, let an impartial inspector see them; or even let them receive mail from their families. Mr. Laird was certainly justified, therefore, in stating that «there is clear evidence» that the North Vietnamese are not treating American prisoners humanely.

## Far Cry From South

What a far cry from the situation of North Vietnamese prisoners in South Vietnam. The International Red Cross has access to all prisoner of war camps in South Vietnam to make frequent and thorough inspections to insure that the prisoners are being treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Lists of names of all prisoners have been turned over to the Red Cross to be given to Hanoi, but Hanoi refuses to accept these lists since they do not wish to admit that there are North Vietnamese Army troops in the South. To support this hollow fiction which absolutely no one believes — too many North Vietnamese have been captured or have defected to make this believable — the ruthless Hanoi regime is willing to disown its own troops. To support the futile pretensions of those who would attempt to write history to suit their own ambitions, thousands of families in the North have been denied the comfort of knowing their fathers, brothers and sons, are alive and well-cared for in the Republic of Vietnam.

When dealing with the mentalities of the Xuan Thuis and the Giaps in Hanoi, it's too much to hope that an appeal to their humanitarian instincts will have any success. But there could be hope of some success if reactions of indignation throughout the world were strong enough to make the automatons in Hanoi realize their true nature is beginning to be understood.

But this is unlikely to happen. The Hanoi regime is made up of men who, like their Chinese Communist tutors, are willing to see millions of their own people suffer and die rather than give up their ambitions for power. They will hardly even note that civilized peoples consider them barbarians who have deliberately taken themselves outside the pale of international law.

LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, Moscow  
1 July 1969

NOVEL BY ANATOLIY KUZNETSOV CONDEMNED  
Review of Kuznetsov's Ogon'  
by Ivan Shevtsov

We still have few books about the working class. Readers rightly complain that no clear, full-bodied portrayal has yet appeared of today's Soviet worker—the worker of the 1960's, whose hands, energy and mind have created a first-class industry, who is extracting oil, coal, ore, who is pouring pig iron, smelting steel, making complex machines and instruments. This lack explains the heightened interest aroused by each new publication devoted to the working class.

in his new novel Ogon' (Yunost' Nos 3, 4, 1969) is a group of metal-industry workers. The time of the narrative is the present. But even the first chapters of the novel put one on the alert and give rise to doubts.

But let us turn directly to the pages of the novel. The main hero of it is the Moscow writer Pavel who travels to observe the starting up of a giant new blast furnace in order to write an essay on the metals workers. He goes to Kosoluchye, located between Moscow and Yepifan, near a large city which is evidently an oblast center. For Pavel this is not simply another editor's assignment. It is a return to his childhood and youth. "Pavel knew Kosoluchye like the fingers on his hand. There he had lived as a small boy. He still had friends there. There his first love affair had even taken place."

Pavel still does not know what he is going to write. First he wants to become acquainted with the lives of the metals workers, penetrate into their affairs and their fates, and perhaps meet his schoolmates. The author does not take a step away from Pavel himself; he looks at the world through his eyes. Sometimes the portrayals of the author and of Pavel merge to such an extent that one has the impression the novel was written in the first person.

The narrative begins rather strangely with the mysterious death of the journalist Dima Obraztsov with whom Pavel had once attended an institute. The role of Obraztsov in the novel is not clear. We do not know what accounts he had to settle with life.

The central group of characters in the novel are school comrades of Pavel's. Some of them he meets at the metallurgical combine: Fedor Ivanov, Viktor Belotserkovskiy, Yaroslav Seleznev, Mikhail Ryabinin, and Zhenya Pavlova. On them the author concentrates all his attention. They represent a collective of blast furnace workers--a part of the working class. They grew up with Pavel, went to school with him, were friends with him, and dreamed with him. Then they were very young, and each of them awaited what fortune would bring. Along the course to the metals workers, Pavel recalls with natural and circumstantial detail his school friends and, utilizing the laws of the logic of life, attempts to guess what they have become--to imagine them as adult citizens of our country.

Fedya Ivanov is a good-natured lout from a large family. He is not distinguished for keenness of mind. He always wore the cast-off clothes of his older brothers. And here is what the "logic of life" has to say about his future: "A little house with a garden next to it, a suckling pig in the grain. He drinks and quarrels with his wife. The rest of the time she nags him. He buys two or three tickets for each lottery but only once won anything. He earns no bonuses and his name is not placed on the honor board at the combine." In a word: "an ordinary man. He plays dominoes in the plant yard, but his main interest is in the lotteries."

A second school friend of Pavel's is Vitya Belotserkovskiy, "who was the brightest personality of the class... Son of a good and cultivated family, refined, with a light touch of the young snobbism of the 20th century... He was the only one in his whole class who had read Norbert Wiener, who even then was well-acquainted with the paintings of Picasso, and who had Stravinskiy and Benny Goodman records. His father's dache was entirely at

his disposal." There, in the author's words, gathered "a little group representing the culture of the century." By the "logic of life," to the laws of which Pavel, and along with him the author, appeal, Viktor Belotserkovskiy should now be "a brilliant scientist, a researcher, an innovator. His works should be appearing in translation abroad."

Next is Slava Seleznev, a very devoted friend of Viktor's, an optimist, a good soul, who in his school years had displayed absolutely no talents. "What Belotserkovskiy learned effortlessly, Seleznev achieved only through desperate efforts." And therefore "he had to lean over backwards to be a good student. He cringed before the teachers. More than once he was caught carrying tales. He willingly did everything he could to win praise--wall newspapers, collecting scrap metal, and such things. He did everything. He loved to sit in class, he was the first to raise his hand to answer" (No 3, p 8)--in a word, and "activist," as the author calls him with crushing irony. Pavel sees his future this way: "a modest employee, burdened with a large family, and a constant viewer of television."

Pavel's fourth school comrade is Misha Ryabinin--"clever, calculating, even-tempered, a solid A-student... because he had a good head on his shoulders... And he was a whiz at mathematics... If somebody was too lazy to multiply 319 by 29, he would ask Ryabinin, who without blinking an eye would instantly answer: 9,251." His mathematics teacher saw in him a future Lobachevskiy, but Pavel foresaw a more modest role for him: "teacher in a vuz with an academic degree."

Finally, one more school friend: Zhenya Pavlova--energetic, passionate, "excelling in abilities," attracted by literature, art, and having dramatic talents. Pavel is not very generous with her (it is the "logic of life," you can't do anything about it) and sees her as an "intellectual wife, the mother of three young children."

As regards Pavel himself, the central figure in the novel, he is shown by the author as a man who is not only positive in all his relations but also as rather successful and not wounded by fate.

In the reader these school friends of Pavel's can at best arouse bewilderment. It seems that everything that has happened to them has been in violation of the laws of the "logic of life"--that not one of Pavel's predictions has come true. Viktor Belotserkovskiy has not become a brilliant scientist and innovator. The former leading figure in the "little group of the culture of the century" has been transformed into a complete cynic and inveterate scoundrel for whom nothing is sacred. He looks with disdain on the workers. For him they are a "mass of persons, united only by the fact that they receive wages for their work. Each of them earns his bread by the sweat of his brow."

He characterizes his school friends in this way: "Misha is good fun, but it is a pity he is such a congenital fool, without any imagination, in short nothing but a swine with a primitive mind." Fedor Ivanov, the head foreman of the blast furnace shop was for Belotserkovskiy a "real mule." About Yaroslav Seleznev he says irritably: "There is a wretch for you. What a rosy-cheeked prattler, hypocrite, parasite, loafer, careerist, dissembler, public do-gooder."

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ist. And Belotserkovskiy has not painted it on too thick in his characterization of him. Incidentally, Seleznev repays him in kind in speaking of Belotserkovskiy: "Not just a literary worker, not just a photographer, not just a rogue. It seems he is all of them together. He has become degenerate, he drinks--a complete reptile and villain" (No 3, p 14).

And, in general, they deserve each other. Seleznev is disgusting in all his relations. At the construction site for the blast furnace he has some kind of unnecessary position as "adviser." A cynic and demagogue, he speaks this way of his duties: "Maximum mobilization of the collective for the accomplishment of the labor upsurge. Training and organization of the workers in the meaning of a socialist attitude towards labor... slogans for the improvement of labor organization, safety practices, ideological-political consciousness" (No 4, p 20). These words from the mouth of a consummate vulgarian and good-for-nothing sound blasphemous and from the lips of the author as a malevolent taunt.

The "logic of life" has also let down the phenomenal mathematician Mikhail Ryabinin. Neither a Lobachevskiy or even "a teacher in a vuz with an academic degree" has he become, but rather he is in an even more modest position: he is the chief cook in a workers dining hall. The main point here is that Mikhail Ryabinin as a person and as a personality is in no way to be distinguished from his classmates Belotserkovskiy and Seleznev. Like them he is a cynic with the philosophy of an arrant petty bourgeoisie. A money-grabber, swindler and thief, he has a comfortable home of his own furnished expensively but without taste. He has the latest in radio phonographs which deafens his guests, although he himself neither likes nor understands music. He hates his trade, but it allows him to have black caviar and Napoleon cognac in his house. On the other hand, the food in the workers dining hall is atrocious.

Nor is the fate of Yevgeniya Pavlova in harmony with the "logic of life." She has not become the mother of three young children; in fact, she has neither children nor a husband. She works in the library of the plant. She takes advantage of the attentions of men and longs for human endearment. She has sought to be honest, but it turns out that honesty and decency are to be acquired at no small price. She is dissatisfied with her fate and disillusioned with life.

Incidentally, almost all the main characters in A. Kuznetsov's novel are without settled family relations. A friend has "carried off" Pavel's wife. Zhenya herself has left her husband. Belotserkovskiy lives with girl friends for whom he rents a room. Seleznev is separated from his wife.

Somewhat apart from this company stands Fedor Ivanov. Despite Pavel's predictions, he has become a respected senior foreman of the blast furnace. He doesn't quarrel with his wife, and the author of the novel says nothing about his lottery playing or bonuses. But in general he seems to be a positive figure, although he gets no particular sympathy from the author and excites none in the reader. Here is one detail in the external portrayal of Ivanov: "He shook his head as though the sweat were streaming down his face, rubbed his eyes with his shirt sleeve, nimbly jumped across the ditch, spreading his feet wide apart, trying not to step into the dirty red water" (No 4, p 40).

Other members of the workers collective are presented in the novel,  
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but except for, if you please, Ivashchenko the secretary of the party committee, they are an indistinct mass. The portrayal of the party secretary is far from an attractive one. Ivashchenko is shown as being none too clever. He cannot understand even the very elementary fact that smoke from the plant's stacks is polluting the air. He reprimands Seleznev but at the same time he himself much resembles this demagogue. Here he is speaking of the blast furnace workers: "The collective, unquestionably, is politically mature. Political activities are conducted regularly in the shop without any interruptions. And what is most important is that the blast furnace shop has held the challenge banner for 3 years."

His words are only empty declarations since they are contradicted by the facts, by reality. The scheduled time for tapping the blast furnace has been set back several times. Finally, the most responsible moment comes: the tapping of the furnace. Everyone is waiting tensely for the river of molten metal to gush forth when suddenly... "from the joints between the bricks a flame spurts out, a bluish flame with the droning noise of dozens of gas stoves." Fedor Ivanov explains: "The gas is breaking out, the furnace is a jerry-built one" (No 4, p 45).

Such is the result of the work of the collective which has for 3 years held the challenge Red Banner and which had been given a responsible assignment--the installation and starting up of the world's largest blast furnace. The accident as depicted is completely improbable. It is impossible to imagine that the installation of such a unique blast furnace could have been entrusted to a collective of hack workers. It is improbable that such hack workers could have retained the challenge banner for 3 years. I wish to ask the author of the novel Ogon' where, in what workers collective, did he find such a gang of cynics, scoundrels, hack workers and alcoholics? How did he draw their portraits?

The trend towards grumbling and denigration is not new. As we know, it has already been discredited and condemned by the Soviet public. However returns to it, squabbles, and attempts to portray our reality in black colors periodically arise in the works of several writers. And A. Kuznetsov's novel is a scandalous example of this. It is permeated throughout by lack of respect for man, by lack of confidence in his decency and honesty--with gibes at the enthusiasm and activities of people, and with open ill-will. A. Kuznetsov is willfully or involuntarily scoffing at the Soviet worker, disparaging and degrading him.

No one can deny that unworthy people can be found in our life, even in workers collectives. But the duty of a writer is to lead them to clear water--to chastise their defects and shortcomings with the sharp pen of satire. This is a truth which none among Soviet artistic and literature figures has ever denied. But, in addition, the method of socialist realism requires that the artist not deviate from vital truth--that he see in life what is significant and typical. In the final analysis life is not an aggregate of facts collected by an irritated grumbler. It is ridiculous to draw generalizations based on the condition of a public lavatory. And yet this is just what A. Kuznetsov has done, without being able to see anything good in the life of a large collective of workers. With sarcasm he portrays not only the workers dining hall but also the lavatory. "The lavatory was at the end of a corridor and there turned out to be nothing there except water spurting out of a broken tap. Scrawled on the door which

a chemical pencil was the message: "Nikolay Zotov, senior furnaceman--your wife is running around with Rizo, and you, you fool, take her to restaurants."

Of course, the broken tap must be repaired. Of course, sorters are too much concerned with gossip. But it is a hundred times indecent and unworthy of a serious writer to drag this kind of stuff into the pages of books. To see in our reality only what is poor and not to notice what is good means to portray life in a false and distorted light. It is just in such a light that A. Kuznetsov depicts it. People are of different kinds--good, bad, and indifferent. A. Kuznetsov sees and portrays only the bad. If you would believe the writer, you would think there were next to no good people in Kosoluch. Just look there--everything is out of order, everywhere the Belotserkovskiys, Seleznev and Ryabinin are flourishing, with the "real mule" Fedor Ivanov moving resignedly beneath them.

The unhealthy tendency, the premeditated displacement of focus, and the author's arbitrariness concerning the logic of life are bound to lead to a distortion of reality. In A. Kuznetsov's work this tendency was noticeable even in his earlier story "Babiy Yar," also published on the pages of Yunost'.

In the novel Ogon' such an arbitrary approach has been carried to an extreme, to the absurd; and, whether the author wished it or not, he has given us not a realistic picture but a malicious caricature. It is true that children in a given class learn different amounts, but in general they are good children, with some more gifted and others less. Yet it appears, according to Kuznetsov, that our Soviet reality does not follow the "logic of life" but rather runs counter to it. The result is that good children become veritable scoundrels. Somebody ruined in Belotserkovskiy a second Einstein; somebody killed in Ryabinin a second Lobachevskiy. Here demagogues like Seleznev flourish. He says that roles in life are not allocated in accordance with capacities. Did the death of the mysterious Dima Obraztsov perhaps represent his settlement of accounts with life? And did the semi-genius Viktor Belotserkovskiy fall into a ladle of molten metal by chance or intentionally? It is true that Pavel only dreamed that this happened to Belotserkovskiy. In reality such people neither sink in water nor burn in fire.

It may be that it is not our reality that runs counter to the logic of life but rather that of the writer A. Kuznetsov, who in defiance of living truth has heaped up in one pile various kinds of vulgar persons and riff-raff, presenting them as a cell of our life and, moreover, as representatives of the working class.

The novel Ogon' is not just a clear creative failure on the part of A. Kuznetsov. It is a most striking example of an irresponsible lack of standards on the part of the editorial board of the journal Yunost', which did not take the steps needed to prevent the publication of ideologically mistaken works, and which is compliant and unprincipled in deciding questions concerning the publication of ideologically depraved materials.

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September 1969

D A T E S   W O R T H   N O T I N G

Mid-September	Pyongyang	Round Table on Tasks of Journalists Opposing U.S. Imperialism sponsored by North Korean Journalists Union and the (Communist) International Organization of Journalists.
October 1	China	20th Anniversary, Chinese People's Republic which was proclaimed 21 September 1949 and has since been celebrated 1 October.
October 1-2	Budapest	Seminar on Peace, Independence and Hunger sponsored by War Resisters International and the (Communist) World Council of Peace.
October 7	East Germany	20th Anniversary, German Democratic Republic which was proclaimed 7 October 1949 in Soviet sector of Berlin.
October 17-31	Budapest	7th Congress of (Communist) World Federation of Trade Unions -- the front that publicly protested the invasion of Czechoslovakia last year (and has since avoided the issue).
October 23- November 4	Budapest	Anniversary of 1956 Hungarian Revolution.
November 7	Moscow	USSR October Revolution.
November 17	Czechoslovakia	30th Anniversary of closing down of all Czech institutions of higher learning by World War II Nazi occupation forces, following mass student demonstrations in Prague protesting Nazi occupation. The day is commemorated annually as International Student Day by the (Communist) International Union of Students which has its headquarters in Prague.
November 29	Albania	25th Anniversary of seizure of power by Communist-led National Liberation Front, in wake of German withdrawal, 1944.
November 30	Finland	30th Anniversary of Soviet invasion of Finland, 1939, during World War II period of Nazi-Soviet Pact.



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~~FOR EYES ONLY~~

September 1969

DISMAL OUTLOOK FOR CUBA'S 1970

SUGAR HARVEST

On 14 July Fidel Castro opened the highly-publicized 1970 sugar harvest with a lengthy, nation-wide television speech at the Antonio Guiteras sugar mill in northern Oriente province. Normally, harvesting would not start for another six months -- until January 1970 -- but Castro will need to extend the harvest period to a full year and workers will have to forego Christmas and New Year holidays in order to produce even seven or eight million tons of sugar. It is considered highly unlikely, if not impossible, that Castro's ten-million ton goal can be reached.

Although Castro boasted in 1964 that Cuba's sugar production in the following five years would be so impressive that "[doubting] imperialists will have no other alternative than to swallow their tongues," Cuba's sugar production has consistently fallen below established goals during the current five-year program to increase the harvest and has never attained the 1952 record of 7.2 million tons. Production reached only 6.1 million tons in 1965, fell to 4.5 million tons in 1966, rose again to 6.1 million tons in 1967, but there was a fifteen percent drop in 1968 production to 5.2 million tons. Although the original goal for 1969 was nine million tons, Castro himself revised this figure downward to 5.5 million tons at the beginning of the year. In spite of the usual mass mobilizations and additional special efforts to harvest and plant in the early spring of this year, by late May Castro revealed that with 85 percent of the cane milled, only a little more than four million tons had been produced. Final production figures have never been published, but it is certain that the harvest was well under five million tons. This means a substantial loss of foreign exchange, which Cuba could use both to meet her debts, mainly to the Soviet Union, and to finance development projects. It also raises even further doubts as to her ability to reach the ten-million ton goal for 1970, and also gives rise to speculation on the political consequences to Castro of failure to reach this goal.

Among the reasons which Castro cited for the disappointing results of the 1969 harvest were the early rains, which hindered the cutting and transportation of the cane, and reduced its basic yield. He also said that old and worn out machinery, a lack of spare parts and difficulties with new machinery created further problems, as did a lack of skilled operators and mechanics. Castro then claimed some workers were not working hard enough and others had spent too much time and effort preparing for the 1970 harvest instead of concentrating on the 1969 yield. He therefore called for more discipline, and said the workers must put moral over material incentives, and work for "an idea, a cause." He said they could not afford to rest on the laurels of past successes because "we have achieved few so far, and we have achieved fewer than we should have. It is our duty to do the maximum."

It was during this same speech that Castro admitted the 1970 harvest would begin in July, using cane left over from the 1969 crop. Four mills

were to have started the 1970 production in July, thus operating without the usual break between harvests, and the other mills would start in September and November. The original starting date for the 1970 harvest was to have been 26 July, to celebrate Castro's 1953 attack on the Moncada Barracks, but this was later moved up by almost two weeks, apparently an act of desperation.

In launching the 1970 harvest, Castro admitted that cane-cutting had never before started so early. Although he claimed that such factors as inefficiency, a shortage of skilled labor, lack of mechanization and modern equipment meant that the harvest period had to be extended, the fact remains that the cane is still too immature for cutting and therefore the yield is less and of poorer quality than it would be at the end of the year. Castro admitted that early harvesting would decrease the yield, as well as acknowledging other risks, such as poor weather, when cane already cut and awaiting transportation to the mills could be lost if roads became impassable. Yet he termed maximum yield as "vital," and therefore the 1970 harvest will be artificially extended.

Although Army units have often been used to harvest sugar cane under the Castro regime, for the 1970 harvest the Army apparently will play a major role. In addition to cutting cane, it will be assigned such extra tasks as "urging" workers to fulfill the work plans laid down, and seeing that discipline is maintained in order to reach the target-goal.

Apparently nobody, including official visitors, is to be spared from participating in the harvest. Recently, some 700 visiting Soviet sailors, with their commanding officer, Rear Admiral Stepan Sokolan, celebrated the 26th of July by joining Fidel Castro in cutting cane in Matanzas province.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500070001-4

## Cuba Asking Russians To Aid Sugar Combines

By MERWIN K. SIGALE  
Special to The Star

MIAMI—Cuba disclosed today that it has summoned a group of Soviet technicians to help solve "numerous mechanical problems" in a new sugar cane combine that has been billed as a major aid in meeting Fidel Castro's record 10 million-ton production goal for 1970.

The announcement, in a Cuban broadcast monitored here, seemed to indicate a setback in Cuba's efforts to mechanize the all-important sugar harvest.

The extent of the situation was not made clear, but it appeared at least to put the Cuban mechanization plan behind schedule.

Thirty of the combines, nicknamed Liberators, had been scheduled to start cutting and loading cane this month in Matanzas Province. About 1,000 were to be produced in time for

the 1970 harvest, which begins late this year.

The Liberator, so named by Castro because it would eventually liberate workers from cutting cane by hand, was developed by Cuban technicians. Castro saw prototypes at work last April and said he was convinced they would succeed.

In December, the Communist party newspaper Granma said Cuban technicians were "ironing out the bugs." They have evidently failed and have now turned to Moscow for help.

At Cuba's request, today's broadcast said, the Soviet technicians will work with their Cuban counterparts "in perfecting the Liberator combine . . . and in the solution of numerous mechanical problems related to that task."

The head of the Soviet group was identified as Nikolai Char-

kov, chief of the mechanization department of the Soviet Ministry of Agricultural Equipment.

The Cubans were working on several models of the Liberator. The thirty machines scheduled for completion this month were to utilize the chassis of experimental Soviet-built combines.

Previous efforts in the last decade to mechanize the sugar harvest have been unsuccessful. Soviet-made combines proved inefficient, and so did various Cuban-designed models.

Tens of thousands of city dwellers have been mobilized to reinforce regular sugar workers in the 1969 and 1970 harvests.

Castro has said that even with the Liberator much of the cane-cutting next year would still have to be done by hand. But he has predicted full mechanization of the harvest by 1975.

Sugar brings in about 85 percent of Cuba's foreign exchange earnings. Castro has called his 1970 target of 10 million metric tons a point of honor for his revolution and a turning point for Cuba's hard-pressed economy. The 1969 harvest is considered a rehearsal for 1970.

If Castro reaches the goal — and most foreign observers are skeptical — he will have topped Cuba's previous record, set in 1952, by almost 3 million tons.

WASHINGTON STAR  
20 April 1969

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

## Women Recruited in Cuba

By MERWIN K. SIGALE  
Special to The Star

MIAMI — The Cuban woman who does no more than keep house and bring up her children is a prime candidate these days for a pair of dungarees and a hoe.

Cuba's Communist regime is recruiting women in greater numbers than ever for productive labor.

According to the official newspaper Granma, "Women will continue this incorporation into work until the day comes when it will be more difficult to find an idle woman than a needle in a haystack."

About 371,000 women are in the labor force now, said Granma. The goal is to add 100,000 this year and reach a million by 1975.

### Obstacles Cited

But "old ideas" about the role of women are a major obstacle, the newspaper acknowledged. For one thing, many women, especially in the countryside, regard marriage as their "fundamental and sole aspiration."

Besides, said Granma, many of the fair sex are unwilling to be cleaning women, or work nights or double shifts, and

others refuse jobs in restaurants, coffee shops and similar places because of "old ideas related to morality which today do not have the least justification."

Granma, the organ of the Communist party central committee, called for "an intense political work of enlightenment to break down all of the psychological and sociological restraints."

The emergence of women into a more active role has been taking form for years under Fidel Castro's regime. Women serve in the militia. Comely lasses wearing blue denims and toting rifles stand guard at factories, stores and public buildings. Castro says women will soon start undergoing military training on a par with men.

### Vigilance Groups

Women play prominent roles in the 2.5-million-member Committees for Defense of the Revolution, the neighborhood vigilance groups. The Cuban Women's Federation, headed by the wife of Deputy Prime Minister Raul Castro, has grown to 900,000 members and serves as the regime's main vehicle for guiding women's

activities.

Now the stress is on productive labor. Cuba has 1.5 million women of working age, 17 to 55, who are neither workers nor students, the Labor Ministry reported.

The chief targets of the job drive are 122,000 single women aged 17 to 35 and 49,000 housewives in the same age span who are childless or have youngsters living with someone else. But mothers with children at home are not neglected. An expanding network of child-care centers is the key.

### 42,000 Accommodated

Clementina Serra, director of the centers and a member of the party's Central Committee, said that more than 42,000 children are now accommodated in 355 centers while their mothers work. She said that four new centers were opened recently near sugar mills in Camaguey Province, because women are starting to replace men in the less difficult jobs in the mills.

More than 1,300 women are now at work in the mills and at cane collection centers, Miss Serra said in a radio interview monitored here, but at

least twice that many are required "to cover present needs."

The program of assigning women to men's jobs was begun on a large scale in March 1968, when the regime announced that 62,000 men would "voluntarily" relinquish their posts to women. The idea was to free the men for heavier tasks, primarily cutting sugar cane, but also in construction, transportation and factories.

A year later, however, only 15,000 jobs have changed hands in this way. This year's goal is for 10,000 more women to replace men, plus 70,000 to fill new jobs and 20,000 to supplant other women who become retired, disabled or pregnant.

The drive for more working women helps to relieve a chronic labor shortage. But that isn't the whole story, Granma said in an editorial.

"More important than this is the need for building a society in which everyone is a worker, everyone a soldier, everyone a student. This implies, as a matter of principle, the complete social liberation of women — an objective that can only be achieved through work itself, through the economic independence of women."

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500070001-4

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

25 April 1969

# Castro pushes Cuban economy

By the Associated Press

Havana

Fidel Castro named it "the year of decisive endeavor." Everybody agrees 1969 will be a year of unprecedented hard work, sacrifice, and probably less consumer comfort for Cuba's eight million people.

There is little doubt the government is making its most serious effort so far to get the economy off thin ice. The goal: a record 10 million tons of sugar production next year.

Present indications are that the government will have to get hustling to make it.

Prime Minister Castro already says this year's harvest — billed as a rehearsal for next year — is not going well. It may make five million tons.

Cuba needs a big sugar harvest to meet credit obligations on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Trade experts say it is possible that Prime Minister Castro can get by financially in 1970 with less than 10 million tons — say eight million tons — if sugar prices stay up.

But the Cuban leader himself has tied political considerations to the 1970 harvest by pledging the honor of his government on reaching the goal. He says the Cuban revolution can be judged once and for all on whether the country makes it.

The result has been to make the 10 million tons a national motto. Huge posters dot the countryside proclaiming "the 10 million are coming." A big neon sign flashes the same news in red, white, and blue on Havana's main street.

Along with the sloganeering has come more work. Some examples:

- More than 110,000 volunteers, mostly young people, are working in hot Camaguey province. Many will stay up to three years.

- Workers in westernmost Pinar del Rio province have pledged to work 12 hours daily. Some in Las Villas province have given up vacations this year. Most factory workers have agreed to work an hour extra daily without pay to make up the production loss of fellow workers toiling in agriculture.

- High-school students who normally spend 45 days in agricultural work are doing 90 this year. Some are staying for 120 days.

- There are mounting indications the government plans to empty the universities next fall and send most students to agricultural labor.

Havana has lost much of its bustle. April is the time of the usual labor mobilization to commemorate Cuba's victory over the U.S.-sponsored Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961. The mobilization will last a month.

Mr. Castro has indicated the traditional Christmas and New Year's holidays will be postponed until July, 1970, when the harvest is finished. This year will be 18 months long, he says.

NEW YORK TIMES

28 March 1969

'69 Is Castro's Effort Year

MIAMI (AP)—This is "the year of decisive effort" in Cuba. And 1970, the Havana radio says, will be "the year of the 10-million." That refers to the goal of a 10-million-ton sugar crop, which would be nearly double the country's 1968 harvest. Premier Fidel Castro gives each year a label.

NEW YORK TIMES

14 May 1969

Cuba Starts Bread Ration

HAVANA, April 13 (Reuters)

—Cubans were restricted today to a quarter of a pound a day in a move to distribute it more fairly. Bread had been sold on a first-come, first-served basis, which meant many people got none at all.

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

10 May 1969

Castro Year-Stretching

Premier Fidel Castro vows Cuba will produce 10 million tons of sugar this year, instead of the usual six million. Here's how he plans to do it:

He has decreed that Christmas and New Year's will not be celebrated until July, 1970—thus making 1969 an 18-month year, putting some of the 1970 harvest into "1969."

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JAPAN TIMES

7 July 1969

## 24 Cubans Killed During Harvest

HAVANA (AP)—Twenty-

four workers were killed in this year's sugar cane harvest, the Communist Party newspaper "Granma" reported Saturday.

The paper quoted Labor Minister Jorge Risquet, from a speech he delivered Monday, as saying the industry also suffered 13,163 personal

injury accidents. Risquet said this amounted to a loss of almost 260,000 man days.

The speech was delivered just before the beginning of

the longest sugar harvest in Cuban history, a 12-month effort aimed at producing 10 million tons of sugar. This season's harvest, which began last year, ran about eight and one-half months.

Risquet blamed the accidents on negligence and workers' carelessness.

### The Agony of Fidel

The economy of Cuba is spiraling downward ... of the Cuba enslaved by Fidel, of the Cuba suffering under the rule of the most treacherous of all outstanding men who for good or evil have emerged in the American continent up to now.

A dizzying descent of the actual figures of this year's harvest has made the Caribbean Hyena cry out in a weeping voice that this is the agony of the harvest, when in reality it is his agony, the agony of Fidel, to whose leftist imperialistic purposes the great Cuban people opposes the formidable weapon of what amounts almost to a sit-down strike.

It has nothing to do with the date of the harvest begun or with the more-or-less intense precipitation index recorded during the cane-cutting period. It has to do with the fact that the peasant, having lost the stimulus of working for his well-being and that of his family, the incentive of his financial independence lost, avoids work that is of no purpose, shuns away from the tasks that will benefit only the Party and Russia, slackens his arm and lets the edge of his machete rust, a machete he always had at the ready in the past, because he sees no reason in producing anything from which he and his family derive no profit.

It is the advanced beginning of the near end. It is a gesture of an entire people who are suffering in silence but not resignedly, and who already giving evident samples of their liberating reaction.

And as a consequence of that action, it does not matter how early Fidel sets the date of the beginning of the harvest or how many inches of rain fall on the Cuban soil reddened and dampened to the point of saturation by the blood of the victims of Castroism. Because in spite of either factor, the harvest will always be lower, as is lower in intensity and vitality the anxious breathing of those, who like Fidel suffer from the symptoms of total, definite, irremediable, unavoidable agony.

Let this be clearly understood: the harvest is not agonizing, Cuba is not agonizing, it is Fidel who is agonizing, strangled gradually by the liberating action of the Cuban people on the march to a better destiny.

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~~FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

September 1969

The Communist Scene

(26 July - 22 August 1969)

I. First Anniversary of Soviet-led Invasion of Czechoslovakia

The Czechoslovak people commemorated this first anniversary according to their own plans for passive demonstrations, following the instructions in their ten-point underground leaflet. They were also able to circulate another leaflet warning against provocations by pro-Soviet elements who were reported to be planning to stimulate anti-regime and anti-Soviet violence in order to give the Soviets and Czechoslovak extremists among the hardliners a pretext for all manner of repressions and a full-scale restoration of terror. Again the Czechoslovak citizenry showed itself a match for the jittery and frightened leadership, which only reflects the fears of its Kremlin masters.

If, as it appears as of this early date after the anniversary, the regime has survived its own worst fears concerning the anniversary, the question now is: what next? Will the power struggle apparently being waged between Husak and some even more extreme hardliners (Strougal and Bilak, for example) come to a head in the aftermath of the anniversary? Will responsible Czech leaders actually admit that the Soviet intervention was justified by terming the Dubcek era as a period of "counterrevolution"? Will the increasing criticism of Dubcek and Smrkovsky lead not only to demotion and progressive political oblivion but to actual punishment? How these matters are resolved in the fall will indicate the future of evolution of Czechoslovakia, either in the direction of a more and more rigid orthodox dictatorship akin to East Germany and Bulgaria, or possibly in the direction of a milder form of dictatorship along the pattern of Kadar's Hungary.

II. Rumania: Fragment of a Monolith

Rumania's enthusiastic reception of President Richard Nixon and the conduct of its 10th Party Congress this month constituted a new affirmation of its special position of independence within the Communist camp. It is a position which the Soviets seem to have accepted, reluctantly and with ill grace. Thus, after the announcement of Nixon's visit (which came as a surprise to the Soviets) was made on 28 June, the Soviet leaders showed their annoyance by cancelling their plans for a visit to Rumania to sign the long delayed renewal of the mutual friendship treaty. They continued to indicate their disapproval of Rumania's cordiality to their traditional enemy by sending a second-ranking delegation to the Congress. (In this show of displeasure toward the Rumanians, they were emulated by the other East European regimes which also sent second-ranking delegations.)



The visit of President Nixon to Rumania was the first by an American president to an East European Communist country, the visit was the occasion for the most tumultuous and enthusiastic welcome accorded any foreign visitor by the Rumanian people, including the very popular General De Gualle. It seems probable that the visit would have been equally successful without the added euphoria created by the spectacular achievement of Apollo 11. Yet, the warmth of the reception seems to have come in some degree as a surprise to the Rumanian leadership, and there is reason to believe Rumanian President Ceausescu was not altogether happy about it. While he had extended the invitation to the President in the knowledge that it could not please the Soviets, still he may have preferred his people not make the occasion an out and out insult to the Soviets by their pointedly great enthusiasm. Further, it seems quite likely that the Rumanian people used the occasion to register their approval of the free western world, symbolized most prominently by the U.S., and by the same token to show their disapproval not only of the Soviet Union but of the well-organized Communist Party dictatorship of Rumania. It is unlikely that this lesson was lost on Ceausescu. It should be remembered that whatever genuine popularity Ceausescu enjoys derives from his willingness to defy the universally disliked Soviet Union, not from his domestic policies, which are far from liberal.

The Rumanian CP Congress produced no surprises, constituting a reiteration of the by now familiar positions of the protagonists. The Rumanians emphasized the pre-eminent importance of sovereignty, while paying lip service to the principle of international unity. The Soviet Union and its satraps paid lip service to the principle of sovereignty and emphasized the pre-eminent importance of unity, adding their warning against the subversive dangers of western "bridge-building," in an obvious reference to President Nixon's visit. As an astute politician, Ceausescu gave unusual emphasis (in comparison to other public occasions) to the community of interests of Rumania with the Soviet Union. But in the final analysis, he persisted in his assertion of independence in foreign and domestic policy -- a concept which the Soviet Union is still unable to accept without reservations insofar as it concerns its immediate circle of European Communist regimes and the free world Communist parties which it subsidizes.

This month, by demonstrating once again its unique position among Communist regimes, Rumania can be seen as one fragment among many (others being Yugoslavia, China, Albania, and even Cuba) which have broken away from the monolith that the world Communist movement once was.

### III. 1848 and the House of Longo

Editorial policy emerging from articles that have appeared in the first two issues of a new Italian Communist dissident monthly, Il Manifesto, spells out the aims of a far-left splinter faction developing within the PCI. The splinter group, which first asserted itself publicly at the 12th PCI Congress in February this year, is led by Central Committee members Rossana Rossanda, Luigi Pintor, and Aldo Natoli. In its publication, which hit the Rome newsstands in June with a 50,000-copy first edition and which is designed to appeal to the non-Communist new left and to young PCI activists, the group has declared itself both anti-Soviet and anti-PCI. Articles in the

first two issues chastize the CPSU for its failure to come to grips with the crisis disrupting the international Communist movement and to condemn Western Communist parties, especially the PCI, for their drift toward parliamentarianism and away from the revolutionary Marxist base of the movement as spelled out in Marx's 1848 Communist Manifesto.

The historical and ideological background of the Moscow Conference was dissected in the June Il Manifesto by editor-in-chief Rossanda. She focused on both the Czech question and the Sino-Soviet conflict to criticize the "authoritarianism" and "rigidly bureaucratic state structure" of the Soviet Union and other East European states. Rossanda described the intervention in Czechoslovakia as the "symbol not only of crisis in the European socialist camp, but also of the impossibility of ending (this crisis) in any way except through repression. . ."

Aldo Natoli continues, with a lead editorial in the July Il Manifesto, to reflect open hostility to the Soviet regime and to demand a new assessment of the Chinese regime. Natoli described the Moscow Conference as having brought the international movement to a stage not of "unity in diversity" but to one of "diversity without unity". He called for a "political initiative to strengthen contacts and exchanges with parties absent from Moscow". . . and for exploring the possibility of "reestablishing contacts with the Chinese regime."

The anti-PCI tone of the publication was set in Luigi Pintor's introductory editorial entitled "Dialogue Without a Future," in which he declared that the idea of revolution as a means to change the existing order had to be revived. He named Marx's Manifesto as the single source of inspiration for righting matters. Pintor criticized the PCI-Christian Democratic dialogue, which he calls "opportunistic and designed to parcel up power."

To date, PCI leadership reaction to the awkward situation created by the appearance of Il Manifesto has been limited to verbal criticism and only heavily veiled threats of possible ousting from the Party. (Note: nobody has been expelled from the PCI since World War II.) The PCI tried to black-list Il Manifesto via a Politburo announcement published in L'Unita (copy attached) which disclaimed Party sponsorship of the journal and in effect warned Party members to keep it off their reading tables.

Indicative of the PCI Politburo's dilemma is the Party's lack of disciplinary action. In fact, an issue of the Party's theoretical journal, Rinascita, was permitted to publish Rossanda's letter of rebuttal to PCI criticism (copy attached). The only attention given the Manifesto faction during a late July PCI Central Committee meeting was the appointment of a "study commission to investigate Il Manifesto."

Chances are excellent that the commission will be busy studying until well after the Italian local elections are held late this year or next spring. "Unity, Vigilance, Struggle" was the headline given by L'Unita

to a reprint of a 5 July speech by PCI Vice Secretary Berlinguer in which he sounded a note of caution about the "Manifesto faction which could undermine unity" in the PCI....and, obviously, besmirch the PCI's image of "sophistication and liberalism" being so assiduously cultivated for purposes of electoral gains. As noted by the Italian leftist weekly L'Espresso: "If the authors of Il Manifesto are expelled from the Party, the Communists will find it difficult to press for a dialogue with the leftist forces -- a dialogue they reject within the Party" (copy of article attached).

NEW YORK TIMES  
18 August 1969

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500070001-4

## Czechoslovakia Plus One Year: A Fearful Kremlin Waits

By HARRY SCHWARTZ

After the experiences at Columbia, Harvard, Berkeley and other lesser universities, every American college president knows that he must avoid a "bust" on his campus at almost any cost. Time has demonstrated unequivocally that whenever police with flailing clubs and tear gas invade academic precincts, they play into the hands of the Mark Rudds, radicalizing much of the student body and faculty and exacerbating whatever confrontation made it necessary to call them in the first place.

Czechoslovakia is hardly an American university, and the Soviet and satellite armies that invaded that country a year ago next Wednesday are much more formidable than the finest of New York, Cambridge and Berkeley. Nevertheless, the case seems strong that last August's "bust" in Prague has taught as disillusioning a lesson to Leonid I. Brezhnev as the campus fracas here brought to Grayson Kirk, Nathan Pusey and Clark Kerr. More than ever now, the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia last August looks like a classic political blunder whose costs keep mounting, with no end in sight.

The best evidence comes from Czechoslovakia itself, where tension is now unmistakably greater than at any time

since the first week after the invasion. The frantic mobilization of the Czechoslovak army and militia, the panicky official pleas for order and reason, the high alert status of Soviet and satellite forces in and near Czechoslovakia, all these speak eloquently of the fear in the Kremlin and among the Moscow puppets who nominally rule Prague and Bratislava.

### Impressive Admission

This admission of mass discontent that could lead to violent outbursts is particularly impressive because the Czechs and Slovaks have historically been the Casper Milquetoasts of Eastern Europe.

The Soviet and Prague preparations now under way imply fear that the mass of Czechoslovak citizens have decided nonviolence does not pay and are thinking of using more active protest tactics. It is implicit acknowledgment that millions of Czechs and Slovaks have been radicalized by their country's degradation.

Those who followed developments during the 200-plus days of the Czechoslovak spring last year know how little the Soviet leaders anticipated these results. Their analysis in early and mid-1968 was that all the trouble and talk about democratic reforms was purely the work of a handful of intellec-

tuals—journalists, radio and television commentators and similar troublemakers—aided and abetted by a few "revisionist" party officials.

The basic Moscow demand of Prague until the day of invasion was for a crackdown on the communications media. Once access to the printing presses, the radio microphones and the television cameras was denied to the handful of articulate agitators, things would return to normal, Moscow felt.

That Soviet analysis was grossly incorrect at the time, but it did have an important kernel of truth. It was the intellectuals who gave the lead in calling for a "socialism with a human face." By August 1968 they had won over and activated only a part of the Czechoslovak people; there remained many workers and peasants still puzzled by the talk of democratization or actually hostile to the intellectuals.

### Invasion Did It

But what the intellectuals' verbal and visual arguments could not do, the Soviet and satellite invasion accomplished overnight. Within 24 hours all Czechoslovakia was united in demanding that Dubcek be freed and returned to power, and that Soviet troops go home. Moscow had to bow then to this unprecedented national unity.

Since then Moscow has been using "salami tactics," slicing away steadily at the concessions it originally gave and seeking to make Czechoslovakia once again the obedient and servile satellite it was under Antonin Novotny. The progress toward that goal has been substantial.

Dubcek has been made powerless and is now the subject of steady vilification; the "revisionists" have been purged from the communication media which are now as censored and almost as politically pure—from a Communist point of view—as Pravda and Radio Moscow. Unfortunately for the Kremlin, however, the audience has been radicalized and no longer needs newspaper articles or radio or TV commercials to understand the truth about Czechoslovakia's subjugation.

The Kremlin's real accomplishment a year ago, it now turns out, was to turn the most pro-Russian people in Europe into enemies of the Soviet Union. It has been a remarkable example of extreme political ineptitude, one based ultimately on a failure to comprehend the force of nationalism today.

HARRY SCHWARTZ, a member of The Times editorial board, is author of "Prague's 200 Days. The Struggle for Democracy in Czechoslovakia."

BALTIMORE SUN  
22 August 1969

## Invasion Is Denounced Worldwide

CPYRGHT

[By the Associated Press]

Bombs rcked Soviet property in Rio de Janeiro, Red China unleashed a new stream of invective and thousands shouted "Russians go ome!" in West European cities yesterday to protest the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia a year ago.

Two bombs exploded at the Soviet Embassy's commercial section in Rio, shattering windows and blowing a hole in a garden wall. Another bomb caused minor damage at the Soviet consulate.

### Mass In Brazil

A Catholic church held an anniversary mass in the Brazilian

capital for those who have died in the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Demonstrations in the European capitals often were noisy but orderly.

In West Berlin, the Soviet action was denounced in separate rallies staged by militant Maoists and anti-Communists.

Danish police skirmished with hundreds of demonstrators in Copenhagen and bottles were thrown at the entrance of the Soviet Embassy there.

### Students In Londo

In London, police halted 30 students marching to the Soviet

Embassy with Czech flags draped in black. Windows were smashed at the Soviet travel agency, Intourist.

In Zurich, Switzerland, Protestant and Catholic churches pealed their bells for five minutes at noon. In Bern, 2,000 torch-carrying marchers assembled in the heart of the Swiss capital, chanting: "Fascists out."

East Germany denounced the anti-Soviet demonstrations in Prague and other Czechoslovak cities as a counter-revolutionary putsch attempt.

Guenter Diehl, spokesman for the Bonn government, said the

invasion anniversary upheaval

in Prague demonstrates "the continuing structural crisis in the Warsaw Pact."

West Germany and Austria announced a "record number" of Czechoslovak refugees had asked for political asylum Wednesday—134 in West Germany and 88 in Austria. The daily average had been about 30, spokesmen said.

Red China and its East European ally, Albania, denounced the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia and said "the day will come when the Czechoslovakian people will drive Soviet aggressor troops out of their country."

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500070001-4

BALTIMORE SUN  
22 August 1969

## Italian Red Leader Condemns Czech Invasion

By WILLIAM F. SCHMICK 3d  
(Rome Bureau of The Sun)

Rome, Aug. 21—The head of Italy's huge Communist party marked Russia's year-long occupation of Czechoslovakia today with stinging condemnation.

Luigi Longo, secretary general of the largest Communist party in the West, expressed "open dissent and disapproval" of last year's invasion by five Warsaw Pact nations.

The action, he said, not only violated Socialist principles of "autonomy and sovereignty for any party and any state," but also served to worsen matters in Czechoslovakia and create new arguments between the world's Socialist countries.

In a 5,000-word statement occupying all of Page 3 in today's issue of Italy's official Communist daily, *L'Unita* Mr. Longo stated:

"We do not believe the military intervention helped our Czechoslovak comrades ... to overcome their difficulties. ...

"Far from solving the problems in the Czech situation, [it] has gravely wounded that people's nationalistic sentiment which aspired for democratic renewal and offered greater possibilities for action against the internal and external enemies of socialism."

"Moreover," he added, "it is just this military intervention which aggravated political and social tensions inside Czechoslovakia, relations between Socialist countries and the differences between Communist parties."

Meanwhile, groups of left-wing demonstrators held protest meetings last night and early this morning outside the Rome embassies of the Soviet Union, Hungary and Poland.

The group outside the Soviet

Embassy arrived by midnight chanting "Stalinists" and carrying placards reading "Out of Prague." A they burned an effigy of a Russian soldier hung with a sign reading "Shame To The Soviet Union."

Mr. Longo, 69, graduated in the Thirties from Russia's guerrilla warfare academy. In his article today, he lamented that he and his followers too often avoided airing in public their disagreements with the Soviet Union.

Last August 21, he led his 8.5 million-voter party into proclaiming "grave dissent" with Russia.

That was the first time the 48-year-old Italian party had openly defied Moscow. And just three weeks later, it was followed by a second, stronger rebuke in which Mr. Longo accused the Soviet Union of opening the way for the resumption

of the cold war and demanded the troops be withdrawn.

In today's attack, he accused Moscow of violating its own ideals, he cited a Soviet declaration of October, 1956, which asserted that relations among Socialist nations should be founded "only on principles of total equality, respect for territorial integrity, independent statehood and sovereignty and non-interference in one another's affairs."

Mr. Longo did not mention that this statement came in the wake of anti-Soviet rioting in Poland and Hungary and while negotiations were still in progress for Soviet troop withdrawals from these Communist satellites.

In his statement today, Mr. Longo repeatedly claimed the Italian party's right to independence.

TELEGRAPH, London  
16 August 1969

## CZECHS HOOT AT RUSSIAN FLAG IN CYCLE RACES

BY OUR DIPLOMATIC STAFF

WHISTLING and hooting broke out in the Velodrome Stadium at Brno, Czechoslovakia, yesterday as the Russian flag was paraded with those of about 35 other nations at the opening ceremony of the World Amateur Cycling Championships.

Derisive shouts were also heard from among the 5,000 spectators, and about half of them seemed to be showing their feeling against Russia only six days before the first anniversary next Thursday of the Russian

invasion of Czechoslovakia.

A more obvious and more sustained anti-Russian demonstration broke out when Russia's Alexander

raced in the first event of the championships. His time in the 1 km race gave him fifth place but ear-splitting whistles and shouts sounded throughout his two-and-a-half laps.

The anti-Russian feeling at the stadium erupted as Mr. Husak, Czech Communist party secretary, told 1,500 party officials in Brno that the government would deal swiftly with organisers of "acts against the state."

Leaflets asking Czechs to stage a passive protest against Russian occupation next Thursday have appeared.

They call for a boycott of buses, taxis, stores, restaurants, theatres and newspaper stands and ask the public to sound horns and whistles and stop work for five minutes at midday.

Gen. Martin Dzur, the Czech Defence Minister, yesterday called on the Czechoslovak Army to strengthen the "fraternal militant friendship" with the Russian armed forces.

the Czechoslovak government announced that Army and the People's Militia were called upon to secure law and order.

Gen. Dzur said that hostile anti-Russian forces planned to take advantage of next week's anniversary.

Gen. Alexei Yedischev, the Russian Army's Chief of Administration, who is in Czechoslovakia, is apparently staying longer than originally planned.

Rumours that the fuel supplies in Czechoslovakia are running low have started a panic run on petrol stations and the authorities were yesterday rushing tankers with emergency supplies to Prague. The State petrol distributing organisation issued an assurance that reports of supplies of petrol being threatened were without founda-

CPYRGHT

## A Year Later the Cry Is Still: 'Russians Go Home!'

The following dispatch was written by New York Times correspondent Paul Hofmann who was expelled from Czechoslovakia last week and drove yesterday from Prague to Vienna. In ordering Mr. Hofmann on Thursday to leave Czechoslovakia within 48 hours, the Prague regime said the action "is not directed against you personally. It is a consequence of the hostile attitude taken by your paper against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic."

It started with flowers and hops and clear-eyed girls right out of the "Bartered Bride," and then came the night of the barricades with teenagers shot dead and a display of naked military muscle by a regime that relies on its own and—ultimately—Moscow's tanks for survival.

Czechoslovaks now wait grimly for a political "settlement of accounts" that inevitably will see a further advance of the hardliners and possibly the loss of the last of the liberal conquests that had yet remained from the "Prague spring" of 1968.

### 'Gestapo' Insult

"Gestapo" was the most frequent shout in Prague last Thursday during the convulsed anniversary of the Soviet invasion. It is the worst insult in a country that has known Heydrich and endured Lidice.

One unforgettable moment: A worker woman old enough to have seen the original Gestapo in grisly action, her deeply lined face white with rage, yelling "Gestapo!" at the policemen who are savagely clubbing a youth in a red shirt after he tried placing a single red rose at the steps of the Saint Wenceslas monument. With him, and now fleeing, are a few girl students from Moravia, just for a day in the capital before going on to Western Bohemia to earn some pocket money in a six-week hop-picking volunteer brigade.

"Holy Wenceslas, Lord of the Czech lands," the brass lettering under the equestrian statue reads, "do not allow us and our offspring to perish."

### Youth Suicides

The monument on the upper end of the sloping Wenceslas Square is a symbol of Czech patriotism and, to the country's young people, a shrine since Jan Palach, the 20-year-old Prague student, set himself on fire last January in a desperate protest against the Soviet occupation.

In unfeeling police-state fashion the pro-Moscow regime on the eve of the invasion anniversary purged the monument of all the flower offerings that are usually on its steps and forbade everyone to approach it. Thus the statue of the semilegendary medieval king who was slain by hirelings once again became the

focal point of popular resistance to foreign-backed rulers.

The disorders spread, soon enveloping the half-mile long Wenceslas Square and eventually most of downtown. Chased by armored cars and uniformed forces with water cannon and tear gas, the anti-Soviet youngsters built barricades and the police and army opened up with tommyguns. At least two youths, aged 18 and 19 years, were killed. Scores were wounded. Close to 1,000 persons were arrested. Among them were some foreign tourists who happened to get caught in the crowd and later told harrowing stories about being foughed up by police interrogators and prison guards.

### Soviet Tanks

The Soviet tanks that were ringing Prague and the other large cities and industrial agglomerations were kept camouflaged but everybody knew they were there and would ruthlessly put down any serious threat to the Communist regime. The Czechoslovak tank columns that did fan out into rebellious Prague neighborhoods were commanded by Soviet veterans of last year's takeover.

The Soviet armor, by its mere presence, was the deterrent it was meant to be, bestowing harsh credibility on the ultra-conservatives who now dominate the Communist party apparatus and the federal and state author-

ities in Prague and Bratislava.

Hundreds of thousands of Czechoslovaks demonstrated with their legs when they walked to their jobs Thursday morning instead of riding by bus or streetcar. The underground opposition had asked for this gesture as a sign of protest. But the mass of the people and, above all, the workers did little more. Czechoslovaks have become realists to the bone in a long history of forced accommodation with powers far superior to their small nation. Few volunteered to sacrifice themselves for a forlorn hope last week.

Many thousands lining the streets in Prague applauded when young militants marched downtown shouting "Russians go home!" and "Only Dubcek!" But few joined the parade. The factories on the outskirts sounded their whistles at noon signaling the scheduled five minute anti-Soviet stoppage, but afterwards the workers went back to their machines. Even in the industrial centers of Pilsen and Ostrava where labor unrest is chronic there were no strikes, and workers stayed in the factories.

The youthful brigadists have left Prague and begun picking hops for the breweries. The power-hungry bureaucrats of the Communist apparatus have started sharpening their sickles—or knives—for their own harvesting. The last liberals are likely to be cut down in the swath of the Marxist-Leninist reapers.

—PAUL HOFMANN

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NEW YORK TIMES  
23 August 1969  
Traffic Halted in 2 Cities  
In Honor of Czech People

BASEL, Switzerland, Aug. 21

(Reuters)—Traffic came to a standstill for one minute today in central Basel to mark the first anniversary of the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia.

BERLIN, Aug. 21 (Reuters)—Traffic was halted briefly today in West Berlin in a demonstration of solidarity with the Czechoslovak people.

Special to The New York Times  
RIO DE JANEIRO, Aug. 21—  
The Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Trade Mission offices were bombed today. Nobody was injured and only minor damage was done.

NEW YORK TIMES  
23 August 1969  
Russians End Czech Visit  
MOSCOW, Aug. 21 (Reuters)

A Soviet delegation headed by Gen. Aleksei Yepishev, the top political officer of the armed forces, returned here today after a 16-day visit to Czechoslovakia.

WASHINGTON POST  
25 August 1969

### Czech Claims

PRAGUE — Czechoslovak television reported from Bratislava that "worker resolutions" were pouring in, supporting the tough stand and stringent new penalties which the current hard-line authorities used to quell the anti-Soviet outbreak.

Some of the resolutions blamed demonstrations that occurred on the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion on alleged weaknesses

of the 1968 reformist leadership under Alexander Dubcek.

Observers said it was apparent that the argument was being prepared that Dubcek did not suppress ultra-reformist "counter-revolutionary" elements when he was Communist Party chief.

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# NEW YORK TIMES August 1969 RUMANIANS MOB AND CHEER NIXON

## President Terms the Visit His Most Memorable— Accords Are Reached

By TAD SZULC  
Special to The New York Times  
BUCHAREST, Aug. 3—Presi-

dent Nixon, flushed with pleasure over a second day of the vast outpouring of Rumanian enthusiasm for him, told President Nicolae Ceausescu this afternoon that his visit to this Communist nation was his most memorable foreign trip.

Mr. Nixon spent a packed day that included an early-morning tour of a suburban municipal market, where thousands mobbed and cheered him and Mrs. Nixon, an hour-long session of political discussions, a session of Rumanian folk dancing and a gay musical luncheon with the Ceausescus. Before departing, Mr. Nixon declared that "history will record" that his talks here "will serve the cause of peace."

"It has been my privilege to visit over 60 countries in the world," Mr. Nixon said in his departure speech at Otopeni Airport. "And of all the countries I have visited, there has been none that has been more memorable than my visit to Rumania."

He then threw his arm around President Ceausescu, who looked diminutive next to him, and both men raised their arms in a triumphant salute to the airport crowd.

### Agreements Are Reached

Although the principal aim of President Nixon's two-day stay in Bucharest, at Mr. Ceausescu's invitation, was to test the conviction again reaffirmed today by the two Presidents that the East and the West can peacefully coexist, the conferences also brought a series of practical results.

Thus, Mr. Nixon and Mr. Ceausescu agreed to reopen formal negotiations on a consular convention, expressed the

hope that negotiations for a civil air agreement could be resumed "at an appropriate opportunity" and decided that a United States library should be opened in Rumania and a Rumanian library in the United States.

A consular convention would permit the opening of additional consulates in both countries. At this time, there is a United States consulate attached to the embassy in Bucharest and a Rumanian consulate at the Rumanian Embassy in Washington. A civil air accord would allow a United States airline, most likely Pan American World Airways, to establish a direct route to Bucharest such as the ones between New York and Prague, Czechoslovakia, and New York and Moscow.

### Statement Is Issued

Another agreement, even more important to Rumania, was contained in a joint statement issued by the two Governments in the place of a formal communiqué. The statement said "it was agreed to look for new ways" of increasing economic exchanges between the two countries.

This suggested to observers here that Mr. Nixon might ask the Congress to grant Rumania a most-favored-nation status allowing her exports to compete on an equal footing with exports from other countries on the American market. The President also has the power to alter the "strategic list" of commodities whose export to Communist nations is banned.

At present, trade between the United States and Rumania totals only about \$23-million annually and about two-thirds of it is represented by Rumanian imports from the United States with most-favored-nation status. Rumania could substantially increase her sales in the United States and thus earn foreign exchange she desperately needs to modernize her economy, especially her industry.

### Differences Acknowledged

When Mr. Nixon emphasized that there were "no direct controversial issues" between the United States and Rumania, he and President Ceausescu made the point of acknowledging differences in international matters.

But, as President Nixon said, "I am convinced after this visit, as I am sure you are, that regardless of the differences in policies the peoples of the two countries are determined to be one."

In the discussions, which covered Vietnam, the Middle East, European security and, according to a separate remark by a White House spokesman, the Soviet-Chinese dispute, the two Presidents in effect agreed to disagree on specific policies while joining in agreement that world peace can be strengthened by the application of principles of respect for the national independence of all countries.

Mr. Nixon was even more specific when, in the words of the official statement, he declared United States policy to be one of respect for the "sovereignty and equal rights of all countries, large and small, as well as their right to preserve their own national institutions and unique national character."

### Party Congress Is Due

Although extraordinary efforts have been made by both sides to avoid any gesture even potentially offensive to the Soviet Union, many diplomats here thought that Mr. Nixon had Moscow as well as Peking in mind in making this last remark.

Soviet reactions are expected to be watched with utmost care in the forthcoming days and especially during the tenth congress of the Rumanian Communist party, due to open in Bucharest on Wednesday.

Moscow has already indicated that only a middle-level delegation will attend the congress, though the Polish delegation is to be led by a member of the party's Politburo. No official delegation lists have yet been published.

But today there were no visible cares in this city of parks and broad boulevards where tens of thousands of Rumanians gathered again to see the Nixon motorcade drive past and to demonstrate their very evident fondness for the United States.

### Reception Is Warm

No schedule of his itinerary had been published, but when Mr. Nixon arrived early this morning, his motorcade and police lines being drawn along the streets in their neighborhoods, they poured out to see Mr. Nixon and applaud him even more heartily than they did yesterday.

All the proceedings were televised live to the Rumanian audience.

Mr. Nixon's first public appearance was shortly before 9 o'clock this morning at the Otopeni municipal market in a middle-class residential district of Bucharest.

Mr. Nixon stopped here and there to look at the tomatoes and the

cabbages and to ask about prices. At one point, Mr. Nixon discovered that a pound of pork costs 10 leis, or about 50 cents. The market, normally closed on Sundays, was opened especially for the Nixon visit.

Outside, where stalls of co-operative farmers are always open on Sundays, Mr. Nixon stopped to taste a grape.

He said: "This tastes excellent. It tastes like the first grapes of the season and like our California grapes."

Then, Mr. Nixon remarked that this "brought back memories" of his California days of working in a grocery when he had to get up at 4 o'clock in the morning "to fix the fruit and the vegetables."

Again, the people among the stalls, old women as well as younger people, pressed forward to touch Mr. Nixon. One elderly woman knelt before Mrs. Nixon, who then kissed her cheek.

### Nixon Joins Folk Dance

President and Mrs. Ceausescu, with warm smiles, escorted the Nixons through the crowds.

The Nixon party was driven to the "village museum," a park where 62 homesteads and houses representing different Rumanian regions have been rebuilt. There were folkloric bands from the different parts of Rumania and, at one point, Mr. Nixon and Mrs. Ceausescu joined with several young people in a round of dance.

It was at the Rumanian guest house, where the Nixons spent the night, that the President entertained the Ceausescus at a luncheon for which food as well as matches and place cards had been flown from the United States.

An Air Force combo was flown from the United States air base in Wiesbaden, West Germany, and both Mr. Nixon and President Ceausescu joked over the fact that the presence of a musical group from a North Atlantic Treaty Organization country did not represent a confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Mr. Ceausescu said that "we should have musical pacts" instead of military pacts.

As a result of Mr. Nixon's visit, the United States Embassy will gain a new residence in Bucharest. Mr. Nixon had remarked that the residence, presently occupied by Ambassador Richard H. Davis, who is to leave next week to be replaced by the new Ambassador, Leonard C. Meeker, was too small for this kind of reception.

Mr. Nixon said he hoped that the next time he could offer a party to the Rumanian leaders at the new residence he had just ordered to be built here.

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NEW YORK TIMES

1 August 1969

**NIXON VISIT HAILED  
IN RUMANIAN PRESS**

Special to The New York Times

BUCHAREST, July 31—Presi-

dent Nixon's scheduled trip to Rumania this weekend was described in the authoritative foreign policy weekly Luema today as a contribution to "peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems."

It was the first editorial comment in the Rumanian press on the Presidential visit since the invitation to Mr. Nixon was issued four weeks ago. The only previous comment appeared in an interview granted by President Nicolae Ceausescu to the Italian Communist newspaper L'Unita and published last Sunday.

In that interview, Mr. Ceausescu stressed the significance of the visit by an American President in a "socialist" country as a sign of changing times and thinking.

Luema wrote that the Rumanian people salute the Nixon visit as being "in the interests of international cooperation and peace."

While Mr. Nixon will be received in Bucharest Saturday with official warmth, the policy is to keep the weekend events at a relatively low key. The invitation has already chilled Rumanian relations with the Soviet Union, and Bucharest would be happier if an outpouring of pro-American sentiment were avoided.

NEW YORK TIMES

3 August 1969

NEW YORK TIMES

5 August 1969

**...and Warmth in Rumania**

President Nixon's brief visit to Rumania provided an opportunity for a display of the enormous fund of goodwill the United States enjoys in that East European country—a goodwill that goes beyond manufactured demonstrations of the type Communist regimes can always muster on order. And Mr. Nixon has rarely articulated the aspirations and sentiments of the American people more accurately or eloquently than he did in his two public speeches in Bucharest.

In the abstract, the President's emphasis on peace, national sovereignty and peaceful coexistence of nations with different political and economic systems may strike some as clichés. But these ideas are anything but clichés in an Eastern Europe that still remembers vividly the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and its satellites less than a year ago.

It was a striking counterpoint indeed to the President's Bucharest visit that on the same day it became known that the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders had met in the Crimea. It is not very hard to guess that the prime topic of conversation in that meeting was how to deal with the rising anger of the Czechoslovak people as the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion approaches.

President Nixon had many different audiences in mind as he spoke and visited in Rumania. In some ways the most important of these audiences was in distant China, whose leaders count Ruman as one of their few friends in an otherwise hostile Communist world dominated by Moscow. For all the care Mr. Nixon took to make it plain that he was not seeking to poison Soviet-American relations, the principles he enunciated could serve as well for improving Washington's now almost nonexistent relations with Peking as for strengthening Rumanian-American ties. Much of future world political developments depends upon Mao Tse-tung's reaction to the unmistakable desire for new beginnings which Mr. Nixon voiced last weekend.

**Nixon and Ceausescu Airport Remarks  
and Toast by Nixon**Special to The New York Times  
BUCHAREST, Aug. 2 —

Following are the texts of addresses delivered at the airport here by President Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania and President Nixon, on Mr. Nixon's arrival today, and of a toast to Rumania delivered by Mr. Nixon at a state dinners

**Mr. Ceausescu's Address**

I am pleased to extend to you, the first President of the United States of America ever visiting Rumania, the cordial greetings of the Council of State and of the Government, to express the feelings of sympathy of the Rumanian people toward the American people, whose contribution to the cause of

world progress and civilization is unanimously appreciated in this country.

I hope that your visit to Rumania, though a short one, will enable you to get more closely acquainted with the endeavors made by the Rumanian people for the Development of the economy, science and culture, the determination to build a dignified, free and prosperous life, and

peace and cooperation with all the states of the world, irrespective of their social system.

Personally, I recall with satisfaction, Mr. President, the meeting we had together two years ago, the spirit of frankness and sincerity during our discussions at that time, and I have no doubt that the same spirit will characterize the exchange of views to have these days.



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# Noninterference Stressed

We believe that in the complex relations of international affairs today, the development of relations between states on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence and respect for independence, sovereignty, equal rights and noninterference in the internal affairs, represents the safe way toward promoting a climate of confidence and understanding among peoples and of peace and security in the world.

In this direction an important contribution can be made through the contacts, meetings and discussions between the leaders of states. We are confident that your visit and the talks we shall have will contribute to the development of relations between our two countries, that they will prove useful and fruitful for the cause of cooperation between nations for general peace.

It is with these feelings and convictions that we welcome you in Rumania today, Mr. President, with the traditional greeting of our people: "Welcome."

## By Mr. Nixon

Speaking on behalf of all the American people I wish to express my deep appreciation for the very warm welcome that you have extended to us on this occasion. I bring with me the warm good wishes and feelings of friendship from all the American people to the people of Rumania.

As you pointed out, this is not my first visit to your country. I recall with pleasure that first visit. It was at the very end of winter, at the beginning of a new spring. I had very useful talks with you at that time, and other Rumanian Government officials. And I recall vividly the warm welcome extended to me by the people of Rumania.

This is an historic occasion. While this is not my first visit to your country, it is the first visit of a President of the United States to Rumania, the first state visit by an American President to a Socialist country or to this region of the continent of Europe.

Mr. President, this significant moment in the history of relations between our two countries coincides with a great moment in the history of the human race. Mankind has landed on the moon. We have established a foothold

in outer space. But there are goals that we have not reached here on earth. We are still building a just peace in the world. This is a work that requires the same cooperation and patience and perseverance from men of goodwill that it took to launch that vehicle to the moon.

I believe that if human beings can reach the moon, human beings can reach an understanding with each other on earth. If we are to make progress in this lifetime effort we must see the world as it is, a world of different races, of different social systems: the real world, where many interests divide men and many interests unite them.

Our meetings represent, I am sure, the desire of the Rumanian people and the American people that we do not allow our differences to prevent a deeper understanding of our national points of view.

Yours is a European country and your most direct concern is therefore with the security of this continent. I come from another continent, but from a country that twice in this century has shed the blood of its sons in the pursuit of that European security. We are prepared to do our part also in this era of negotiations so that all in Europe can pursue the fulfillment of their just aspirations for a better life, free from the fear of war or the threats of war, and in constructive cooperation with others near and far.

## Nixon Gives Equality

Let us agree at the outset to be frank with each other. Our differences are matters of substance: indeed, no nation's range of interests is identical to any other nation's. But nations can have widely different internal orders and live in peace. Nations can have widely different economic interest and live in peace.

The United States believes that the rights of all nations must be equal, but we do not believe that the character of all nations must be the same. My country has already undertaken new initiatives to reduce the tensions that exist in the world. We stand ready to respond firmly and positively to sincere and concrete initiatives that others may take. Every nation, of whatever size and whatever region of the world, will find

us receptive to realistic new departures in the path to peace.

The purpose of your invitation, Mr. President, and the purpose of my visit here, is to improve communications between our two nations. This is a useful and a peaceful purpose. In that spirit of realism and of openmindedness I look forward to our talks. I thank you for your hospitality.

## Mr. Nixon's Toast

This visit to your country is a brief one; and I regret that it is not longer. For though your country is smaller in geographical size than ours, it shares the quality of diversity. You have magnificent river valleys, great mountains, sea shores, forests and farmlands. The various regions of your country have varied histories and traditions.

One bond we share is that of ancestry. More than 160,000 people of Rumanian origin have come to the United States to help us build our nation. Today, almost a quarter of a million Americans can claim one or both parents born in Rumania.

While our visit here is brief, we have already seen many people and will have the opportunity to view some of your accomplishments and a cross section of your rural life. And we in the United States are aware of the strides your nation has made in building a modern industrial society.

## 'Cause of Just Peace'

When I arrived, I spoke of a cause close to the heart of the American people—the cause of a just peace, a peace among peoples of differing races and differing beliefs, a peace among nations of different interests and different social systems. We know mankind cannot build a just and lasting peace until all nations recognize and respect the rights of other nations, large and small, to a secure existence and to the fulfillment of their national aspirations.

There are great contrasts between our two countries—in resources, area and population, in histories and national traditions. Our political and social systems are different. Our economic policies are at variance. We do not share each other's views on many issues about the nature of our world and the shape of the future.

But Rumania and the United States are both members of the human family, and thus both enjoy

the same rights and responsibilities. Each wishes to preserve its national institutions and unique national character in a shrinking world. Each wishes to advance the economic wellbeing of its own people. Each seeks peaceful solutions to international disagreements; each believes in better understanding and greater communication between those who disagree—and that is why these meetings are being held.

## Rumania Is Praised

Your country pursues a policy of communication and contact with all nations—you have actively sought the reduction of international tensions. My country shares those objectives.

We are seeking ways of insuring the security, progress and independence of the nations of Asia, for as recent history has shown, if there is no peace in Asia, there can be no peace in the world. My country will bear its proper share of the burdens of building peace in that part of the world.

We are prepared, in Europe, to consider all concrete and promising possibilities of removing tensions. We favor negotiations on disputed issues—not for the sake of negotiation, but for the sake of resolving the disputes in order to improve the existing situation and advance the security of all.

We are prepared to negotiate seriously on the crucial and complex problem of strategic arms. And will consider any arrangement that equitably protects the security of all concerned while bringing the quantitative and qualitative growth of arsenals under control.

## Peace in Middle East

We seek a stable peace in the Middle East, a peace in which all the countries of the region, and those outside of it, can repose confidence—an a peace which no one, whether inside the region or outside, will seek to exploit for narrow purposes.

We seek normal relations with all countries, regardless of their domestic systems. We stand ready to reciprocate the efforts of any country that seeks normal relations with us.

We are flexible about the methods by which peace is to be sought and built. We see value neither in the exchange of polemics nor in a false euphoria. We seek the substance of detente, not its

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"We consider that a war of defense cannot be but a popular war and that victory will be won not only at the front but through the general fight of the whole people."

### Home guard explained

This, Mr. Ceausescu added, was the meaning of the steps taken by the government to form "patriotic detachments"—the "popular" home guard set up last year—and for the military training of youth.

Both measures were taken during the grave uncertainty felt here in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Ceausescu went on to reaffirm Romania's stand against any Soviet domination within the Communist world and its own principles of independence and noninterference.

Again he made no direct allusion and did not mention the "Brezhnev doctrine" which rules that Communist states must put "internationalism" before national interest.

But the world Communist system, he said, "is not a bloc in which the states are fused into a whole, giving up their national sovereignty, but the assertion of socialism is an international force by its victory in independent states."

NEW YORK TIMES

8 August 1969

## Russian, in Rumania, Hints Criticism of Nixon's Visit

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

BUCHAREST, Aug. 7—A Soviet representative told Rumania's Communist party today that the "perfidious tactic"

of bridge-building was "undermining the cohesion of socialist countries" in Eastern Europe. The statement was understood here as a clear criticism of President Nixon's visit to Rumania last week-end.

The statement was made by Konstantin F. Katushev, the chief Soviet delegate to the 10th Congress of the Rumanian Communist party.

Later Mr. Katushev walked out of the hall when a message of greeting from the Chinese Communist party was being read.

The Chinese party sent no delegates to Bucharest and its message consisted mainly of salutations to the Rumanians. It did, however, wish the Rumanian party success in "the defense of national independence in socialism," a remark that could be construed as an allusion to the Soviet pressures on Rumania.

At the moment the announcement was made that the Chinese message would be read, Mr. Katushev, a stocky man in a dark suit, rose from his seat on the right-hand side of the rostrum reserved for the Presidium of the Congress. He returned a few minutes later when a message from the Laotian Communist party was being presented.

Although Mr. Katushev—a secretary of the Soviet Communist party in charge of relations with foreign ruling parties and a fast-rising figure in Soviet politics—mentioned no names in his speech, his criticism of the "perfidious tactics" was interpreted as a barb at President Nixon's recent visit to Rumania.

It was also interpreted as a criticism of Rumania's President and party chief Nicolae Ceausescu, who had issued the invitation to Mr. Nixon.

### Russian Stresses Cohesion

In the opinion of many Communists here, the Katushev address raised the question of how Mr. Nixon's trip to Rumania may immediately affect United States-Soviet relations. It also represented a reply to Mr. Ceausescu's keynote speech yesterday in which he urged freedom of policy for individual Communist parties.

The question of the Communist parties' independence is the crux of the quarrel in the Communist world. Mr. Katushev pointedly cited today the recent statement by Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist party, that the Soviet Union "will spare no effort to strengthen the cohesion of the Communist movement and will fully carry

out its internationalist duty."

The concepts of "socialist cohesion" and of "internationalist duty" to defend socialism have been invoked by Mr. Brezhnev to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia a year ago and are again being increasingly emphasized in Soviet pronouncements.

Mr. Katushev's stress on the Soviet view of Communist unity was answered a few hours later by Paul Niculescu-Mizil, one of Mr. Ceausescu's top associates, when he told the congress that "Marxism is a living science and must not be put in a straitjacket."

Expressing the philosophy of the independent-minded Rumanian party, Mr. Niculescu-Mizil, the party's chief ideologist, said that "the unity of all the socialist countries must not be affected by the diversity of views."

He said that each Communist country and party "has the right to develop its own road to socialism."

Mr. Katushev, in his strongly implied criticism of Mr. Nixon's visit and other United States policies in Eastern Europe said:

"We are all aware of the bitter struggle that the imperialists are waging against the socialist countries. Our class opponents have recourse to any ways and means in this struggle: from the perfidious tactics of 'bridge-building' aimed at undermining the cohesion of the socialist countries and causing friction between them, to openly supporting antisocialist

forces and hatching counter-revolutionary plots; from the attempts at economic penetration to direct military interventions."

The phrase "bridge-building" to Eastern Europe was originally used by Lyndon B. Johnson when he was President to describe United States efforts at improving relations with Eastern Europe, notably in the economic field.

The reference to "counter-revolutionary plots" appeared to echo Soviet charges that the United States had a hand in the Czechoslovak liberalization of early last year.

Mr. Katushev's emphasis on what he described as the growing aggressiveness of the imperialists and his charges of American subversion led experienced Communist observers here to wonder whether this may not be a prelude to a new freeze in relations between Moscow and Washington.

They noted that the obvious Soviet displeasure with Mr. Nixon's visit to Rumania might be reflected in further delays in the disarmament talks, which the United States hoped to see open some time this month.

The United States also came under attack by Nguyen Van Kinh, the chief North Vietnamese delegate, who described the Nixon Administration as being as bad as its predecessors. He said that the planned withdrawal of 25,000 American troops from Vietnam was simply an attempt to deceive the world and American

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We seek, in sum, a peace, not of hegemonies, and not of artificial uniformity; but a peace in which the legitimate interests of each are respected and of all are safeguarded.

More than a billion people around the world saw and heard the landing on the moon. And thoughtful men saw the earth in a new perspective—as the home of the human family whose similarities and common interests far outweigh the differences.

#### Relations Improving

Because all nations must search for understanding, value the discussions we have held today, and look forward to our discussions tomorrow. I note the steady growth of bilateral relations between us in recent years, our bilateral ties in many fields have expanded. We want them to continue to grow.

Let me express my gratitude for the gracious welcome accorded to my family, my colleagues and myself here in Bucharest. I accept it both as a tradition of your people and a token of respect for the United States. Speaking for the American people, I can say that we respect your national independence and sovereignty; prosperity in the development of your country.

In the United States we occasionally use the phrase "Forward together." I have discovered that the concept is not original. For my toast tonight, may I use the words of Mihai Eminescu, a great Rumanian poet: "May your sons go forward, brothers hand in hand."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

8 August 1969

# Ceausescu affirms vow to defend independence

By Eric Bourne  
Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Bucharest, Romania

Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu has said again at the party congress here that his country would defend itself against any attack on its independence. He has also restated Romania's refusal to accept the Soviet theory of "limited sovereignty" among Communist states.

There is nothing new in either point. The Romanians have upheld these ideas about the relationship among Communist powers for some years — and especially firmly since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia last August.

But the significance of Mr. Ceausescu's spelling them out again is the current background of evident Soviet displeasure at the warm reception given President Nixon during his weekend visit.

#### 'Constructive' intent stressed

[An Associated Press report from Bucharest says the Soviet Union assailed Romania's economic and political contacts with the West Thursday and expressed official displeasure at President Nixon's weekend visit to Bucharest.

[The attack was delivered in a speech to the 10th congress of the Romanian Communist Party by Konstantin Katushev, chief of the Soviet delegation.]

The Soviet press scarcely mentioned the visit itself. It has also refrained from any direct criticism of the Romanians at this latest demonstrations of determination to coexist with East and West regardless of different political systems.

#### 'Nationalism' hit

For their part, the Romanians have hoped the Soviet leaders would recognize the "constructive" intent behind the Nixon visit and that nothing in it was intended to change or impair Romania's relations with the Soviet Union or its ideological loyalties to the Communist alliance.

But if the Romanians profess to believe that the Russians were not too seriously perturbed by the visit there are outside observers who take a more cautious view. Moscow's relative restraint, they say, does not necessarily mean it was not irked or was taking an easy-going view of Romania's latest show of independence.

From comments about "nationalism" within Eastern Europe and other evident digs at Romania, the Soviet press has gone on to give prominence to the "Bratislava Declaration" signed 12 months ago by the Czechs and the five Warsaw Pact powers which invaded Czechoslovakia a few weeks later.

In the Soviet view, the declaration, in effect, justified the intervention in advance.

According to Pravda Aug. 3, subsequent events in Czechoslovakia have confirmed that "the measures taken by the brother parties to reinforce the position of socialism and the collective defense of socialism were absolutely correct and were taken at the necessary time."

#### Cave noted

Read in conjunction with the Soviet comment that Moscow will brook no intrusion on its role and interests in Eastern Europe, there are observers here who believe those words to be addressed today to the Romanians as much as to the Czechs.

However this may be, Mr. Ceausescu saw fit this week to deliver one of his most careful statements of the Romanian position. It was an adroit performance which firmly rebutted the Soviet contrary view on inter-party relationships and responsibilities and yet avoided direct polemics or friction.

He made no reference to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He did not mention Mr. Nixon's visit.

He began with a fulsome eulogy of the Soviet Army's "decisive" role in World War II, allotting it the major credit for "saving mankind from fascist slavery."

He lauded friendship and cooperation with Russia and the Communist alliance as "one of the cornerstones" — not "the" cornerstone, it was noted — of Romanian foreign policy and pledged cooperation with the Warsaw Pact.

But there were other passages clear enough for all to appreciate, though there was no specific reference to well-known areas of disagreement between Moscow and Bucharest, such as the intervention in Prague and the absolute sovereignty of all the Communist states.

"Under present-day conditions," Mr. Ceausescu said, "in case of war, not only the Army but all the citizens must be ready to fight for the defense of liberty, sovereignty, and integrity of the homeland."

**By Eric Bourne**  
Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Most of Romanians "democracy" is still inside the party. Even there, increased rights of discussion and criticism for its near 2 million members are counterbalanced with demands for more discipline and discipline. And a strengthened, not reduced, "leading role" for the party is envisaged as this participation process develops.

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WASHINGTON STAR

13 August 1969

# Ceausescu Undisputed Boss As Party Conclave Adjourns

By ANDREW BOROWIEC

Foreign Correspondent of The Star

BUCHAREST—The crowd of

some 200,000 dispersed quickly after the tones of the "Internationale" and the last applause died down.

Teams of kerchiefed women moved in to sweep the huge Gheorghiu-Dej Square outside the palace once inhabited by Romania's kings.

The demonstrators had come in organized groups to applaud "Tovarasul" (Comrade) Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania's president and Communist leader, at the end of the ruling party's 10th congress yesterday.

He spoke to them from the balcony of the faded palace dominating the square. They responded with chants of "Ceausescu, Ceausescu."

## Backed by Populace

Ceausescu is the undisputed boss of Romania, backed not only by the party apparatus but also by the bulk of the 20 million inhabitants who approve his nationalistic and cautiously anti-Russian line.

The congress and its decisions confirmed Ceausescu's power. The party machine eliminated some old guard "conservative" holdovers such as Gheorghe Apostol and Chivu Stoica.

It approved Ceausescu's search for a "specifically Romanian communism" and an ambitious five-year economic plan.

It elected—by secret ballot—165 members of the Central Committee from among some 300 candidates. It expanded the party presidium from eight to nine members, all of them staunchly loyal to Ceausescu.

The congress confirmed Romania's "independent communism" with as little reference to it as possible, eminently conscious of possible Soviet wrath.

Above all, it gave Ceausescu,

another five-year mandate to lead the country without the slightest internal challenge.

The crowd—massed to witness the "historic conclusion" of the congress—cheered Ceausescu long and with apparent enthusiasm.

It also cheered several other members of the Central Committee whose names were boomed by a loudspeaker: Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu and one Paul Niculescu-Mizil, who last week spoke in defense of Romanian Communists after a stiff warning by Russia.

The congress, which started a week ago, was a low-key affair with few ideological clashes, with many innuendos and no sweeping assertions by the Romanians.

Delegations invited from other Communist parties were asked to avoid polemics. They did. Soviet delegate Konstantin Katushiev was perhaps the only exception. But he did not plunge into any ideological problems either. He simply warned Romania in Russia's name to stay within the Soviet bloc.

And yesterday it was Katushiev who stood on Ceausescu's left before the crowd. On his right was Delores Ibarruri, the famous "La Passionaria" of the Spanish civil war.

The Romanians selected comparatively inconspicuous party members to answer Katushiev during the congress. The answers were mild, very much in keeping with Romania's delicate position.

Perhaps the last public assertion of Romania's independence at the congress was made Monday when Bucharest party delegate Dumitru Popescu spoke of the "abandonment of many rigid, over simplified and dogmatic views."

"The new party line," Popescu said, "is in a clear-sighted, realistic spirit; and he stressed, 'the establishment of full equality among nations.'"

No such thoughts were expressed in Ceausescu's speech yesterday.

"Our problems were solved in a democratic way, in the spirit of self-criticism," Ceausescu said. "The congress marks a new stage in the development of our party and in the construction of socialism."

## A Secret Ballot

Indeed, the congress did mark a step forward. There was discussion; there was a secret ballot.

But the party, entrenched in power for some 25 years, confirmed itself as the only political force allowed in this country. It did so in stressing that consolidation of communism inside Romania will be carried out on Romania's terms.

This does not mean that any sweeping changes will occur. The party, whose existence is at stake, cannot allow rapid democratization of the kind that had been evident in Czechoslovakia before the Soviet invasion.

The party called for the "deepening of party democracy," and at the same time for the "strengthening of party discipline. It also encouraged 'large-scale utilization of criticism and self-criticism.'"

The main practical decisions affect Romania's economy, which is expanding steadily although still with very limited blessings for the average citizen.

The party approved stepped up industrialization, intensive development of modern agricultural methods, a sustained investment program, increased productivity and increased economic relations with foreign countries.

L'UNITA, Rome  
15 May 1969

COMMUNIQUE OF THE PRESS OFFICE OF THE PCI DIRECTORATE

The Press Office of the PCI Directorate circulated the following  
communique yesterday:

"Some weekly publications have announced the forthcoming publication of a magazine called Il Manifesto to be directed by comrades Rossanda and Magri. The Press Office of the PCI wishes to specify that this undertaking is not sponsored by the Party, is not the result of an understanding with its directive organs, and does not commit any of its organizations. Therefore, it is characterized as a personal choice and activity of individual comrades, to whom the Directorate has made it clear that it considers this undertaking as not being motivated by a desire for freedom of research and discussion, which was given full expression in the XII Congress and which is fully assured in all headquarters and in the Party press and in confrontation of Communists with other political and cultural forces."

L'ESPRESSO, Rome  
29 June 1969

WILL IL MANIFESTO DIVIDE THE COMMUNISTS?

"This publication is born of the conviction that the struggle of the workers' movement and the history itself of the movement have entered a new phase; that many dedicated plans for the interpretation of reality and the many ways of behavior have been bypassed for all time; that the social and political crisis surrounding us cannot be withstood and tackled with normal administration." These are the opening words of the editorial of the first issue of the new Communist review directed by Lucio Magri and Rossana Rossanda - the review called Il Manifesto, which appeared on Monday, 23 June, in kiosks and in book stores. The review's publication (as L'Espresso has pointed out in former issues) did not come about without some difficulties. The party central committee has twice discussed the attitude to take vis-a-vis this initiative. At the last meeting, held at the beginning of last week, the fifth commission of the central committee assumed an especially rigid position. A month ago the party press had limited itself "to advising against publication" of the new periodical and to showing that "the official reviews of the party are disposed to welcome every kind of presence," it finally emphasized the announcement that some regional and federation secretaries had come out for the "inadmissibility of the initiative."

The editors of Il Manifesto thus had confirmation that in addition to the traditional right represented by Giorgio Amendola and Giancarlo Pajetta, the people adamantly opposed to their review are found in the party's more bureaucratized strata. It is precisely the intermediate cadres who control the regional and provincial federations and rule the red municipalities who fear the effective opening of that broad internal debate which the new periodical advocates. In its inaugural editorial, Il Manifesto in fact hoped explicitly for "a cultural revolution and not a battle of ideas among intellectual general staffs." This presupposes the commitment not only of including new interlocutors in the doctrinal discussions held on the pages of Rinascita or Critica Marxista, but also of promoting and even inaugurating a continuous exchange of ideas between the party's base and its summit, which could obviously create serious difficulties for the party's bureaucratic apparatus.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500070001-4



Without underestimating the strength and importance of the resistance of the "apparatchiki" (career bureaucrats), it is necessary to bear in mind that the political moment favors the new review. The climate of intimidation that once accompanied the publication of the review Citta Aperta, resulted in the excommunication of men like Chiaretti, Attardi, Vespignani, and Socrate, and initiated a critical discussion of the Hungarian affair has long gone. It seems improbable that Berlinguer, who has just returned from the Moscow conference of the 75 communist parties where he stressed the principle of "unity in diversity," i.e., the autonomy of the various communist countries vis-a-vis Moscow, could now give a clear-cut demonstration of intolerance on an internal manner. Longo and PCI leadership group have in fact assumed for the moment a questioning attitude, confining themselves to asking that the initiative of Il Manifesto editors be effected within the framework of "democratic centralism" and not mean the institutionalization of a direct faction of the "new left."

The collaborators of the first issue of Il Manifesto and those envisioned for the second belong to the original nucleus that runs from Lucio Magri to Rossana Rossanda, from Luigi Pintor to Massimo Caprara, from Aldo Natoli to Michele Rago. There are a few others who belong to the "left" of the PCI and to the PSIUP. These are Colletti, Foa, Collotti-Pischel. At any rate, the editors are hoping that in the future the debate will extend to other strata of the party and find interlocutors on the international level. In summary, the initiative seems destined to last, and Il Manifesto, despite certain suspicions at the summit and the opposition of the base, will continue the struggle for a more liberal circulation of ideas and for the acceptance of dissent within the party, without this resulting in the imposition on the editors of direct or indirect sanctions of a disciplinary nature.

RINASCITA, Rome (theoretical journal of Italian CP) Italian language.  
25 July 1969

#### EDITOR ASKS PCI SUPPORT FOR OPEN DISCUSSION

Among the mail we received regarding Il Manifesto and the article by Paolo Bufalini, entitled "About a New Magazine," which appeared in issue number 27 of the Rinascita, was a letter by Comrade Rossana Rossanda. We publish it here along with a reply by Comrade Bufalini.

Dear Rinascita:

The article by Comrade Bufalini and the meetings on all levels in which the executive office critically posed the question of Il Manifesto, suggests limiting my reply to the essential point: why we undertook the task, and its place in reference to problems of unity and the nature of the party. Therefore, I will set aside certain criticisms of the content made by Comrade Bufalini which would take more space than I am allowed and which I will deal with in Il Manifesto. I also will set aside the questions about motivation, accusations about monotony, superficiality, oversimplification, half-truths, fatuity, ambition, which, it seems, are quickly used to attack anyone who insists on pushing a discussion beyond an agreed-upon political horizon.

It is true that Il Manifesto is an unusual undertaking in a communist party, and that it affects its internal order: it proposes political discussion outside as well as inside institutional channels. It was not undertaken lightly; its promoters, many of its contributors, are comrades who always have been involved in Party work for the Party -- a chosen life's work for us all -- and not, as Bufalini says, "political polemics." If, beginning around 1960, controversy accompanied our work, and if there sometimes was disagreement about important aspects of our line, it is because the movement was influenced by new and basic processes forcefully brought to the attention of every militant. These processes were not only ideological but material and real -- from the rupture of the international communist movements to the re-submission in the West of the problem of the shift from democratic revolution to socialist revolution. This process brought to a historical end not a few certainties; not a few interpretive patterns became shopworn; like every living organism, we cannot refuse to change, together with the framework in which we operate, and the price of refusal to change is sterility. It is reality which imposes upon us new and controversial bases for discussion, new attitudes toward discussion, new ways of discussing.

1) New ways of engaging in discussion, because in the face of these urgent needs not only research or debate but even awareness is slow. Let us take a burning example: China, and the events in the European socialist camp, dramatically emphasized by the Czechoslovak affair. Comrade Bufalini criticizes us for having reported only on the ideology of the "cultural revolution," and not on the overall picture -- which is certainly less clear cut -- of its concrete reality. This is a limitation and we have written that we want to overcome it, even though the ideology that supports that reality certainly is not a secondary element. But, in the name of completeness and objectivity, how much more severe a criticism should be directed at L'Unita which for a long time had no other source on the "cultural revolution" than the imperialist agencies in Tokyo and Hong Kong, carefully -- it is true -- picked up from TASS? Or of Critica Marxista (Marxist Criticism) or of the Gramsci Institute which did not even attempt an approach, even critical, to the problem? So far, only Rinascita has furnished some bits of partial information. Regarding the European socialist camp, upset not only by the lacerations of 1956 and 1968 but by endemic phenomena, -- economic difficulties, suppression of freedoms, the reverse of nationalisms, certain regurgitations of racism -- where can we find research on the origins, an attempt at interpretation of the dynamics and the results? At every breath we say -- and Berlinguer repeated it at the Twelfth Congress -- that a Marxist analysis, a truthful statement, is also needed concerning socialist countries. How does it happen that we always stop with this statement of method?

2) The gulf between words and actions certainly are not the effects of underestimation, but of a political choice. The lack of information on China is explained when we realize that what is taking place is a colossal error; that in the controversy, it is the Soviet view that must be supported. The absence of an analysis of socialist nations indicates a hesitation to break with the view given by these leadership groups. The limits of information and priorities are the expression of a judgment, of an overall picture. It is the insufficiency of this picture that is put into question



within and outside the Party; and it is necessary to come to grips with this reality. In our view, perhaps no one more than the Italian Communists could suggest an interpretive key. Phenomena such as the Cuban revolution (which we did not "praise," but tried to understand -- Comrade Bufalini always seems to misunderstand what we write) departures from soviet patterns, or those of the Latin-American communists parties, or the "cultural revolution," have at their base a statement on the revolutionary subjectivity and the choice for democracy from the base. These are understood better through "the revolution against capital" and the polemics on advice, rather than through the hatefully conceived Castroist plans in Italy or certain neo-Stalinist deliriums coming from the "Marxist-Leninists." There is greater richness in our theoretical tradition than in our political positions, and in the latter, more ideas than in our daily practice.

3) This limitation weakens the orientation and the political plans of the Party. We are in the presence not only of a radicalization of the social conflict, but of new forms of political maturity of the subjects of struggle. We do not mean to say only that the social lacerations -- such as the French "May," the revolt of youth, the explosion of alternative content and power in the course of every struggle -- again bring up at every turn the question of the nature of the crisis, and whether it can succeed within the system; "if" and "how" the question of socialism is of immediate importance. We also say that these questions are posed not only by the vanguard party, but directly by the protagonists in these struggles. The need for socialism is no longer "taught" as it was at one time, but it is an immediate living thing. It is society which pushes toward its own transformation, not the trail-blazing by a vanguard. But this changes the pedagogical party-mass relationship, which until now existed in politically and structurally immature societies. We do not at all believe that this means the end of the need for the party; on the contrary. Never as now do the very size and independence of processes demand a unification, a strategy, a theory. But it is certain that the formation of this united project cannot fail to take place in ways better articulated and more complex than the enlightenment of a vanguard; still less can it be identified only with the decisions of a party still organized like a relatively separate body in which discussion and formation of political will is subordinated -- even through the most democratic of mechanisms -- to a rigid delegation of power, to a markedly vertical and centralized structure.

In any case, this is not a recent discovery: it is sufficient to reread Rosa Luxemburg. It is today that the growth of the anticapitalist forces in the fire of social conflict, the disintegration of social democracies and the Catholic unity, urgently pose the problem of an articulation of channels, of a broadening of independence, of a mixture of moments of elaboration and proposal, of the formation and testing of decisions. If we do not realize this, we risk repeating the error made with the student movement: when a sectarian reflex prohibited us from understanding in the decisive months -- those months in which our possibility of hegemony over it entered into play -- the reasons for an unprecedented revolt of a generation against its system and merely because it manifested itself in ideological and organizational modes which were different from ours. We paid a not inconsiderable price: it ebbed, and certainly our youth organization was not strengthened by it. Today 400 students lay siege at the doors of the FIAT, and among them, the Party and the union, non-communication increases,

margins of error increase; it is increasingly difficult to administer in unity an explosive movement which has a single enemy, which demands from the revolutionary Party a show of effective hegemony.

4) This also weakens the Party as an instrument, in its internal life. We all feel the need to defend a patrimony: unity. But when the difficulty is so deep, when the situation so full of ambiguous potentialities when the single voice of communism on an international scale seems so impaired, and therefore, when all the militants understand and react differently, or with different accents, to the lessons of experience, how can unity be achieved if not through a permanent exhaustive study, a broader internal scope, a courageous search for forms of discussion that are less circumspect and limited? If unity is conceived as a strenuous defense of a majority line, to which are subordinated apparatuses and instruments of work and information in the name of a "homogenization" on the level of decision and execution, this scope is lost. And the consequences are what we all know: contradiction between the possibility of participation and the progressive weakening of militancy; the breadth of the field of operation and the restriction of decisions. The limited political tone of life at the base, the progressive reduction of our Central Committee as a place of discussion of decisions already made (1) have as their counterpart the hemorrhage of membership, the chronic weakness of the FGCI, the growth of a discontent that never succeeds in becoming productive, even though it might be an alternative. Our party has taken a courageous step: in the presence of a split, it has recognized the right of dissent. But we will leave it to others to become overly emotional about this safeguard of democratic rights of each militant. And it fell to me, at the recent Congress, to go to the microphone to argue my rejection of the political motion, in a climate of fraternity and respect guaranteed first of all by the Chair. But may I be permitted to say that I am an old communist; the right of dissent, in the past as in the future, is of little importance to me. I see its sterility, its weaknesses. I seek the contrary. That is why with Magri and other comrades we have started Il Manifesto: to transform a negative position, necessarily hastily conceived and sketchy, into a minimally positive program, to attempt an integrated exhaustive study of those knotty problems which -- in our view -- weigh on the movement and demand a solution. Certainly, they involve ideological and political choices which may even be alternatives. It is a matter of seeking out their roots, studying them, submitting them to the Party for verification. Does this mean attacking the unity of the party, or does it mean substituting the clarity of a realistic confrontation for confused, unexpressed and reticent discussion?

5) But Comrade Bufalini objects that this could lead to a split, and the answer to this danger could cause rigidity in the internal mechanisms of the Party. This is an important point, and therefore I want to be clear. Not only am I and the comrades who started Il Manifesto against a status of factionism, but we also believe that this improvement in the quality of the kinds of discussion should actually lead in the opposite direction.

We oppose splits, but not because of a metaphysical concept of party unity. In our current debate, a clearly divided party has become a synonym for social democracy; it is forgotten that the Russian October and its civil war were directed by a heavily and publicly divided party even though it was not by the furthest stretch of the imagination social democratic. The Chinese revolution was born of an internal struggle, almost a secession, which was long and extremely bitter. The Cuban revolution was born without

a party at all, out of Castro's capacity to unite markedly heterogeneous and independently organized groups. Instead, a series of circumstances has resulted in the fact that until today it has not befallen a rigorously organized party to initiate and direct a revolutionary process. This is not an invitation to division: merely a reference to that history which Comrade Bufalini so often accuses me of ignoring. But above all it seems that we must free ourselves of the idea that the alternative to a party split into fragments must necessarily be a party such as that derived from the model of the thirties, and on the basis of which we have all developed. Even after having eliminated splits, the Bolshevik party granted the right to groups of militants, or members of the Central Committee, to openly present different political platforms and publicize them, and this not merely at the congresses. Only in an advanced stage of his power did Stalin succeed in achieving the dominance of a concept of democratic centralism. From a method of discipline in action, he turned this into a method of vertical centralization and control of debate. Thus, the militant was atomized and there remained no other right of development and proposal than the individual enterprise, or with the organization and through the organization. And the practice -- so normal in every area, not merely scientific but also in the most varied forms of human activity -- of any informal grouping, based on common interests, was pointed to as the spectre of a nucleus whose purpose was to operate against the party and for the conquest of power from within.

Therefore, the opening of channels that do not represent a single voice, of independent expression in information and proposal, does not represent a break with the Leninist hypothesis of the party. But the problem is not "juridical": it is political, it has its roots -- if it has them -- in the concrete fact of the times we are passing through. It was not on the basis of a right, but on the basis of a de facto consideration, that the PCI proposed a different order of debate, the frank institution of dissent and the different ways of developing ideas within the international communist movement as the prior condition for possible ideological unity in the future, and as an element that would not prejudice unity of action in the present. Is this view to be discarded on the internal level? What sense, then, did it make for us to greet the new forms of political expression in Prague's "new road?"

Something must be changed in our way of life if we want to root unity in the increasingly more complex articulation of society and its political expressions. The Comrades of Il Manifesto and I believe that we are facing a new phase of party conception, in which it is a matter of rescuing all the wealth of ideas and adapting them to the new task of presenting ourselves as the guide for a process of transition conducted not only by a plurality of political protagonists, but of social protagonists. This means going in an opposite direction to fragmentation, and that is, toward a multiplicity of "open" forms -- such as expressions of independent explanation within the party and between the party and class -- instead of through closed structures each one with its monolithism, its discipline, its opposition.

I emphasize this because the appeal we made in our editorial for a "cultural revolution of our own" caused a certain scandal. What could we have meant if not that today democracy tends to mean something more than a delegation of authority to institutional forms, no matter how well articulated; that it means affirmation of what an old tradition of vertical structure forces us to call "the base, those from below" -- and who are the direct,

non-mediated, expression of class? And we meant that in this profound, truly dialectical reversal of power balance it is not the Party that would face a crisis. It would be renewed and saved. And in the course of an impetuous emergence of energy from the base, of their direct material needs, it is not Party unity that would be destroyed, but only the residue of vertical structure and authority, authoritarianism which historically has accompanied the concept of unity under other conditions in the communist parties. Certainly this is nothing but a reference -- the heart of a liberal phase which existed, -- before the "cultural revolution" and perhaps in a more exemplary way -- in the Commune. And it should be clear the Il Manifesto's ambition certainly cannot be that of starting this process. These are processes that only a political body in its entirety can undertake and guide. Il Manifesto does not wish to be anything but a witness to this need, which is not only our own. And therefore it asks from the Party more than tolerance: open, critical, fraternal assistance.

(1) Certainly, free discussion: Comrade Bufalini charges that I failed to raise objections to our participation in the international conference at the Central Committee meeting at the end of May. To tell the truth my statement in Il Manifesto was intended to have a more general character than the question of whether to attend or not after a date for the conference had been set; but what concrete sense, what concrete possibilities of influence could this statement have had after the conference had practically begun, if not a gratuitous weakening of the position of our delegation? Thus, by calling a meeting of the Central Committee not at the beginning, but in an advanced stage of government crisis, how can the Central Committee contribute to setting forth the position of the communists in the decisive phase?

L'ESPRESSO, Rome  
20 July 1969

#### STATUS OF NEW LEFT MOVEMENT IN PCI DISCUSSED

[Article: "The Proof of the Manifesto"; Rome, L'Espresso, Italian, 20 July 1969, p 6]

Next week the PCI Central Committee is to consider the matter of Il Manifesto, the monthly review directed by Lucio Magri and Rossana Rossanda that expresses the positions of the PCI's "new left." It now seems probable that this debate will conclude with the taking of disciplinary measures against the founders and principal collaborators of Il Manifesto, or even with their expulsion from the party.

It is not known if this ultimate step will be taken. There are individuals in the PCI leadership group (but they constitute a small minority and do not want to give themselves away) who should like the Central Committee to concern itself entirely with Il Manifesto and to examine the content of the monthly only after its political line has been manifested more clearly.

The discussion that Magri's and Rossanda's review has caused within

the PCI has been intense and especially animated. Representatives of various political orientations have agreed on the necessity of discouraging its publication, still having in mind a monolithic and authoritarian picture of the party and considering the initiative inadmissible. Others, supporting some of the theses of Il Manifesto's founders, counselled against its publication because of the poor timing of the appearance of the review, for the 12th Congress at Bologna and its wide-ranging debate had undoubtedly heralded a shift in the life of the party. Moreover, Italian communism was committed to an ever-increasingly open debate with the Soviet leaders. The line that prevailed was then that of avoiding a head-on collision with the founders and collaborators of Il Manifesto by expelling them from the party. However, the collision was merely postponed to a more propitious time.

The situation worsened at the end of June, following the publication of the first issue of the monthly. The entire communist leadership group in fact agreed that it contained an attack against the party itself, and not merely against some of the PCI's political decisions. This was especially manifest, the group believed, when the review invited rank-and-file communists to inaugurate a "cultural revolution capable also of putting into question a consolidated patrimony."

The first response came through Paolo Bufalini's hard-line editorial in Rinascita, where he, although seemingly expressing his own opinion, severely criticized Il Manifesto in the name of the entire PCI leadership for the review's splitist action, an imputation that in communist tradition virtually always preludes disciplinary measures or expulsion. A little later, administrative measures were taken against some collaborators of Il Manifesto who are party officials. This has given rise to the atmosphere of uncertainty and tension in which the Central Committee will meet.

The preoccupations of the PCI leaders over the initiative of the representatives of the "new left" cannot be overestimated. The review was purchased by 50,000 members or sympathizers, and the PCI does not yet appear disposed to tolerate the uninhibited circulation of ideas within the party. Those who at the Botteghe Oscure (CC headquarters) intend to advance the process of ideological renovation and separation from the USSR, a process initiated on 21 August 1968, fear that Magri's and Rossanda's monthly will be a pretext for those who, with older means and intentions, intend to set for themselves the goal of initiating a polemic against Longo and Berlinguer from the standpoint of pro-Soviet positions.

These considerations, which can be valid, would suffice in the aggregate to justify taking disciplinary measures against Il Manifesto. This, in fact, could be done by the communist leaders who in Moscow supported the thesis that even profound dissent must not result in splits, thereby disregarding their own words when the debate is shifted from the international level to the party's internal life. Nor can they ignore the fact that evaluations in Il Manifesto which they adjudge to be inadmissible can stand side by side with those that in time may be officially acceptable, for example, Rossana Rossanda's criticisms of the ambiguity of the formula "unity in diversity."

Finally the PCI leaders must evaluate their attitude toward Il Manifesto against the general background of Italian politics. The prospect before the entire left, the communists affirm, is that of a progressive rapprochement until the attainment of organic unity. This process, they say, will not occur quickly or as the crow flies. It will lead not only to rapprochements, but also to separations and splits. But it is a good thing that political motives will underlie the splits. If, instead, they were to be the offshoots of excommunications and expulsions, they could not but delay the development that they say they favor. Because of this, the Il Manifesto affair is an important episode in Italian political life. If the authors of Il Manifesto are expelled from the party or forced to leave it, the communists will find it difficult to press for a dialogue with the leftist forces, a dialogue that they reject within the party.